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Competition Agencies with Complex Policy Portfolios:  
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Current Draft: 20 February 2013 
 
David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic1 
 
 
The worldwide adoption of competition law is a remarkable 
development in economic regulation.  More than 120 jurisdictions have 
enacted competition laws, and roughly 90 of these have come into being 
since 1990.2 Companies accustomed to regarding antitrust rules as the sum 
of commands issued by the European Union and the United States now 
must account for policies set in countries such as Brazil, China, and India. 
In only the past five years, major additions have included the establishment 
of a new antimonopoly law in China and a thorough overhaul of India’s 
system.3    
 
The attention now given to the formation of antitrust laws globally 
has obscured an important characteristic of the institutions entrusted with 
their implementation.  The agencies established to enforce competition laws 
often have mandates that encompass other policy responsibilities.  The U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is an informative example.  The FTC is a 
policy conglomerate, a body whose mandate combines antitrust, a wide 
range of consumer protection functions (most notably, oversight of 
commercial advertising and marketing practices), and an increasingly 
important role as the principal U.S. data protection and privacy agency.4   
 
                                                
1 Hyman is H. Ross & Helen Workman Chair in Law and Professor of Medicine, 
University of Illinois.  From 2001-2004, he served as Special Counsel at the Federal Trade 
Commission. Kovacic is Professor at the George Washington University School of Law.  
From 2001-2011, he was, at various points, the General Counsel, Commissioner, and 
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.     
2 On patterns in the adoption of competition laws, see William E. Kovacic, The 
Institutions of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1019, 
1042-43 & n. 82 (2012).  One excellent repository of information on the establishment of 
new systems is the International Competition Network, whose members include the 
competition agencies of roughly 100 jurisdictions.  Modern developments in the creation 
and implementation of competition systems can be followed on the ICN website, which is 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org. 
3 On the modern competition law reforms in China and India, see Competition Law in 
the BRICS Countries (Vassily Rudomino et al. eds., 2012). 
4 On the FTC’s diverse mandate, see Federal Trade Commission, The FTC in 2012 
(Mar. 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/highlights/2012/ftc-highlights.pdf.  
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The FTC’s multi-dimension policy portfolio is the norm among 
jurisdictions with competition laws.  Over half of the jurisdictions with 
competition laws assign to what often is called a “competition agency” 
important economic policy functions beyond competition law. For example, 
more than thirty jurisdictions rely on a single agency to enforce antitrust 
laws and to implement consumer protection statutes (especially measures 
that ban false advertising).5  Other countries employ still more elaborate 
combinations such as Peru’s INDECOPI (antitrust, consumer protection, 
trade, intellectual property, and bankruptcy), Russia’s Federal 
Antimonopoly Service (antitrust, advertising, and public procurement), and 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (antitrust, consumer 
protection, and regulatory matters involving the telecommunications 
sector). Still other countries, such as the Netherlands and Spain, are 
considering the formation of new government bodies that would merge the 
competition agency with various other regulatory authorities 
The specific amalgamation of policy tasks within a single 
government body has important consequences for how competition 
agencies define their goals, allocate resources, and select programs to fulfill 
their duties.  The assignment of multiple regulatory tasks can deeply affect a 
competition agency’s performance, just as it affects the performance of 
other agencies. This issue has attracted little attention in competition policy 
circles,6 although public administration scholars (and, to a far more limited 
extent, legal academics) have done important work on such issues in other 
areas.7  
                                                
5 Some of the world’s best known competition policy bodies share this design 
characteristic, including the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) and 
Canada’s Competition Bureau. 
6 Noteworthy recent exceptions have examined the combination of competition and 
consumer protection duties in a single agency.  See, e.g., Competition Committee of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Background Documentation for 
the Global Forum on Competition  (Feb. 21-22, 2008) (collecting materials  on “the 
interface between competition and consumer policies”); Katalin J. Cseres, Integrate or 
Separate – Institutional Design for the Enforcement of Competition Law and Consumer 
Law (Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance, Working Paper Series 2013-
01, Jan. 2013). 
7 An abbreviated list of articles on the subject by legal scholars would include Jody 
Freeman & James Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 Harvard 
L. Rev. 1131 (2012); Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 Columbia L. 
Rev. 746 (2011); Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 181 (2011); 
Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 
Texas L. Rev. 15 (2010); Jacob Gersen, Designing Agencies: Public Choice and Public 
Law, in Research Handbook in Public Law and Public Choice, D. Farber & A. O’Connell, 
eds. (2010); Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of 
Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2009); Dara K. Cohen, Mariano-
Florentino Cuéllar, and Barry R. Weingast, Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and 
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Despite this gap, there is growing interest among government 
agencies in the links between institutional design and agency behavior.  In 
scholarly commentary and in the work of multilateral organizations such as 
the International Competition Network (ICN), there is greater recognition 
that the quality of a nation’s competition policy depends crucially on the 
effectiveness of the institutions entrusted with the formulation and 
implementation of that policy.8  There is little point in discussing what 
substantive programs the world’s competition agencies should pursue 
without a more careful examination of how they agencies will carry them 
out.  As we have suggested in other work, the latter inquiry inevitably and 
necessarily involves an assessment of institutional design.9 
In this article, we continue our analysis of the relationship between 
agency design and performance.  We illuminate the dynamics that influence 
the assignment of regulatory duties to an agency, how those dynamics (and 
the allocation of responsibilities) can change over time, and how the 
specific combination of regulatory functions and purposes can affect agency 
performance.  We focus on the organization of public competition agencies, 
                                                                                                                       
the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 Stan. L. Rev. (2006); Jacob E. Gersen, 
Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
201; Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and 
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1655 (2006); David A. 
Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 Yale L. J. 
955 (2004); Jonathan Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of 
Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L. Econ. & Org. 93 (1992).   
Public administration scholars and political scientists have spent decades on these 
issues.  See, e.g., Karen M. Hult, Agency Merger and Bureaucratic Redesign (1987); Beryl 
A. Radin & Willis D. Hawley, The Politics of Federal Reorganization: Creating the U.S. 
Department of Education (1988); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 212 (2000); Amy B. Zegert, Spying Blind: The CIA, 
the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (2007); David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of 
Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-
1997 (2003).   
The literature on the organization of private firms is, of course, vast.  See, e.g., Harold 
Demsetz, Ownership, Control, and the Firm (Blackwell 1990).    
8 See Daniel A. Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement (2011); 
Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Anti-Federalism, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2008) (studying impact of 
institutional arrangements in shaping outcomes in U.S. antitrust system); William E. 
Kovacic, The Digital Broadband Migration and the Federal Trade Commission: Building 
the Competition and Consumer Protection Agency of the Future, 8 J. Telecom. & High 
Tech. L. (2010) (describing institutional elements for successful competition and consumer 
protection programs). 
9 William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Competition Agency Design: What’s on the 
Menu?, 8 European Competition Journal 527 (Dec. 2012).  David A. Hyman & William E. 
Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life-cycle and The Goals of Competition Law, 
Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2013).     
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but our analysis has obvious implications for agency design at other 
governmental levels (i.e. both trans-national, and sub-national),10 and to the 
design of public and private universities,11 and other nonprofit entities.       
Part II provides a historical perspective on the complexities of 
designing a public agency.  Part III spells out a basic analytical framework 
for analyzing the problem of agency design.  It then identifies seven factors 
that have proven significant in predicting the success and failure (judging 
by both durability and popular and academic regard) of any given 
combination of functions.  Part IV applies our analysis to the FTC and its 
combination of competition, consumer protection, and privacy 
responsibilities.  Part V poses the question whether the correct solution is to 
“divide or conquer.”  Part VI concludes.    
 
II. Public Agency Design 
 
A. First Principles 
 
To create a public agency, one must specify at least five major 
institutional characteristics: (1) the agency’s relationship to the political 
process (the autonomy/accountability tradeoff), (2) the governance 
mechanism (management by a single executive or a multi-member board, 
(3) location within the government (stand-alone institution or sub-unit of a 
larger body), (4) exclusive or shared policy responsibilities; (5) single- or 
multi-purpose mandate, and (5) the policy instruments the agency may use 
                                                
10 See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, Cuomo’s Deep Reach Into Regulatory Territory 
Could Provoke Clash in Albany, N.Y. TIMES Feb. 15, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/nyregion/16cuomo.html?hp (describing proposal to 
merge “the state’s Insurance and Banking Departments, along with the Consumer 
Protection Board, into a new Department of Financial Regulation. . . [aides] said a single 
regulator with broad jurisdiction would be more effective than the patchwork of agencies 
charged with protecting New Yorkers from financial fraud. . . It could have the effect of 
transforming the superintendent of the new agency into a second “sheriff of Wall Street,” 
forcing [Attorney General] Schneiderman, a fellow Democrat with whom Mr. Cuomo has 
clashed in the past, to compete for high-profile cases.”)   
11 For example, at the University of Illinois, physics is in the College of Engineering, 
but chemistry and chemical engineering are in the College of Liberal Arts & Sciences.  
Agricultural economics is in the College of Agricultural, Consumer & Environmental 
Sciences, but the economics department is in the College of Liberal Arts & Sciences.  And, 
there are a series of smaller units, institutes, and centers, whose independent status remains 
an open issue.  See Stewarding Excellence @ Illinois, Academic Unit Reviews at 
http://oc.illinois.edu/budget/projectteams.html#unitreviews and Initiatives and Small 
Centers, at http://oc.illinois.edu/budget/projectteams.html#smallcenters.  Similar issues are 
also raised within individual units.  Should the law librarian be a member of the law 
faculty; the library faculty, or both?    
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in carrying out its duties (e.g., data collection and reporting, law 
enforcement, business and consumer education,  rulemaking, administrative 
adjudication, civil and/or criminal authority).12  
Our analysis focuses on the fifth of these questions: the assignment 
of policy tasks.  In a rough sense, we are taking a step toward sketching out 
the public administration equivalent of Ronald Coase’s Nature of the 
Firm.13  Post-Coase, scholarship has recognized the complex issues raised 
by the specification of the boundaries of the firm, and the linkage between 
organizational and institutional choices and firm “outputs.”  When do firms 
carry out some functions themselves, and when do they contract with 
others?  How do firms decide between contract, acquisition, and joint 
venture, when they are not able to do something themselves?  Why do firms 
enter some product lines and geographic areas, and not others?  Are 
conglomerates, which participate in multiple independent and unrelated 
lines of business, a good idea or not?  How important are transaction costs 
(i.e., the relative costs of out-sourcing versus internal production) and 
product complementarities (i.e., should a manufacturer of mobile phones 
also make apps?) in specifying the boundaries of the firm?    
How then should we think about the “optimal” boundaries for a 
government agency’s substantive responsibility? 14  The polar solutions are 
obviously unacceptable: no one creates an agency and fails to give it 
something to do, and there are no takers in a modern nation state for a 
“Department of Everything.”  In between, the dividing lines are less 
obvious: how does one decide whether an administrative agency should 
have N or (N+1) or (N+10) areas of responsibility?  What counts as a 
distinct area of responsibility?  Does it depend on whether the areas involve 
separate substantive bodies of law – and how are the boundaries to be set?  
Should the same agency enforce both civil and criminal laws?  Should the 
agency combine legislative, judicial, and executive functions, or just 
amalgamate two of the three – and which two?  What arrangement 
minimizes the possibility of capture by those being regulated?15  What 
arrangement will be most appealing to the legislators who create the agency 
in the first place – as well as those charged with oversight and budgetary 
authority?  If another agency already occupies part of the field, is it better to 
                                                
12 These and other important institutional choices are set out in Kovacic & Hyman, 
supra note 9. 
13 Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 286 (1937). 
14 Some of these parallels are explored in Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private 
Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, 17 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 306 
(1999).  See also Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi & Schulz, The Two Dimensions of 
Regulatory Competition, 26 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 56 (2006). 
15 Cf. Barkow, supra note 7. 
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expand capacity at the existing agency, add responsibility to the existing 
agency without expanding capacity, or create an entirely new agency?  
Should we have multiple agencies responsible for the same general area – 
and if so, how should their jurisdiction be defined and enforced?  If we want 
closer coordination of policy and implementation, should we combine two 
(or more) agencies into one, or are other strategies (e.g., creating a 
coordinating council or a “czar”) more effective?  What are the differing 
consequences of creating a new agency, adding new functions to an existing 
agency, and reorganizing governmental functions?  And so on.  
To address these questions, we first examine the forces that 
historically have shaped the assignment of regulatory tasks to agencies.   
 
B. Constructing The Regulatory Portfolio 
Unlike business firms, which set their boundaries through 
acquisitions, contracts, expansion and contraction, government agencies 
acquire substantive responsibilities through one of four paths.  The simplest 
case is the assignment of specific functions to a particular agency by 
deliberate legislative choice. Congress created the FTC in 1914 as an 
alternative to the Sherman Act’s prosecutorial model, which vested public 
enforcement in an executive body (the Department of Justice) and relied on 
the federal courts to adjudicate cases and shape doctrine.16 Congress 
intended Section 5 of the FTC Act, which authorized the Commission to 
address “unfair methods of competition,” to enable the FTC to follow a 
more activist path in enforcing antitrust law and doctrine.17  The agency was 
to apply this authority to develop norms of business conduct.      
When it is allocated explicitly by statute, regulatory authority may 
be shared, concurrent, or exclusive.  There are numerous instances where 
regulatory authority is shared between a sector-specific agency (e.g., the 
Federal Communications Commission in telecommunications) and a 
government body with a broader generic mandate to address certain 
categories of business transactions (e.g., the Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division and the control of mergers).   Alternatively, Congress can grant 
concurrent authority to two agencies, as is the case with the grant of merger 
control authority under the Clayton Act to the DOJ and the FTC.  
Agencies can also acquire regulatory or operational authority by 
accident or fortuity.  As noted above, the original ambit of the FTC was 
antitrust law, and there is no evidence that Congress intended for it to play a 
                                                
16 See Crane, supra note 8, at 13-26 (describing institutional choices underpinning 
adoption of the Sherman Act).. 
17 15 U.S.C. Section 45.  The establishment of the FTC is examined in detail in Marc 
Winerman, The Origins of the Federal Trade Commission: Concentration, Cooperation, 
Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2003). 
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role in consumer protection.  However, from its first years the FTC used 
Section 5 of the FTC Act to respond to complaints from business firms 
about their rivals’ deceitful marketing campaigns, Congress explicitly 
expanded the FTC’s authority so it could challenge “unfair” and 
“deceptive” business practices.18   
More broadly, an agency with capabilities originally designed to 
serve one purpose may find those capabilities suitable for other analogous 
purposes – e.g., “if you’ve got a hammer, why not help other agencies with 
nails that need pounding?”  Thus, helicopters and warships used to deliver 
troops into combat also can be used to assist civilians suffering from natural 
disasters, such as earthquakes or floods – explaining why the humanitarian 
programs of the Department of Defense have expanded considerably in 
recent years. 
An agency’s regulatory jurisdiction may also be affected by agency 
action in response to changes in business products or technology.19  
Consider privacy and data protection policies.  Modern advances in 
communications and information services technology have dramatically 
expanded the ability of firms to collect and use information about consumer 
behavior and preferences.  The United States does not have an omnibus 
privacy and data protection statute.  Instead, the U.S. regime consists of 
federal and state statutes that regulate specific sectors (e.g., data collection 
and use by health care providers) or specific types of transactions (e.g., 
financial services), with regulatory authority dispersed among the agencies 
responsible for administering each of these statutes.   
The resulting policy vacuum allowed the FTC to emerge as the 
leading federal privacy agency, by virtue of several cases it brought against 
firms that failed to fulfill promises concerning data protection.20  The FTC 
                                                
18 The formative legislation is the Wheeler-Lea Act, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).  This 
evolution is described in Marc Winerman & William E. Kovacic, Outpost Years for a 
Start-Up Agency: The FTC from 1921-1925, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 145, 193-95 (2010). 
19 We exclude technological developments that cause Congress to act.  So, the 
emergence of powered flight resulted in a new branch in the Department of Commerce, 
which ultimately became the FAA.  
20 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Electronics Company Agrees to 
Settle Data Security Charges; Breach Compromised Data of Hundreds of Consumers, Feb. 
5, 2009, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/02/compgeeks.shtm; Federal Trade Commission, 
Iconix Brand Group Settles Charges Its Apparel Web Sites Violated Children's Online 
Privacy Protection Act, Oct. 20, 2009, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/iconix.shtm; 
Federal Trade Commission, CVS Caremark Settles FTC Charges: Failed to Protect 
Medical and Financial Privacy of Customers and Employees; CVS Pharmacy Also Pays 
$2.25 Million to Settle Allegations of HIPAA Violations, Feb. 18, 2009, at  
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/02/cvs.shtm; Federal Trade Commission, FTC Says Mortgage 
Broker Broke Data Security Laws: Dumpster Wrong Place for Consumers’ Personal 
Information, Jan. 21, 2009, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/01/navone.shtm.     
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also issued reports in December 2010 and March 2012 which proposed a 
policy framework for handling privacy issues.21  The Department of 
Commerce has sought to play a role into the same policy space, triggering a 
behind-the-scenes contest for regulatory primacy, which Congress has not 
yet settled.22  In like fashion, the development of broadband networks has 
similarly sparked a dispute between the FTC and the FCC over which 
agency will oversee this element of the communications sector. 
The same dynamic has played out in operational terms within the 
DOD on several occasions.  Technological development invariably triggers 
intense contests to determine which of the uniformed services will control 
the deployment of weapons based on the new technology.  Consider nuclear 
weapons.  The Air Force, Army, and Navy all sought to occupy the relevant 
policy terrain, devising solutions that were based exclusively on each 
service’s area of primary expertise.  The Air Force emphasized long-range 
bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles.23  The Army developed 
intermediate range ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable artillery pieces.  
The Navy built ballistic missile submarines and acquired carrier-based 
aircraft with the capacity to deliver nuclear weapons.  Congressional 
appropriations to each service and allocations to particular weapon systems 
functioned to indicate the winners and losers of the fight for operational 
dominance.    
Finally, there is legislative divestiture.  Perceived failure (especially 
catastrophic failure) can spur Congress to divest some of an agency’s 
functions, or fold the entire agency into another institution.  So, as detailed 
below, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico resulted in a 
fundamental reorganization of the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”) 
in the Department of Interior. The melt-down of the financial markets 
resulted in the shuttering of the OTS, and transfer of its functions to the 
OCC.  The devastation of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina 
                                                
21 Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid 
Change (Mar. 2012), at http://www.ftc.gov/os.2012/03/130326/privacyreport.pdf; Federal 
Trade Commission, FTC Staff Issues Privacy Report, Offers Framework for Consumers, 
Businesses, and Policymakers, Dec. 1, 2010, at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/12/privacyreport.shtm  
22 See Press Release, Commerce Department Unveils Policy Framework for Protecting 
Consumer Privacy Online While Supporting Innovation, Dec. 16, 2010, at 
http://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2010/12/16/commerce-department-unveils-
policy-framework-protecting-consumer-priv.  
23 The Air Force was originally unenthusiastic about ballistic missiles, since they 
threatened the supremacy of the bomber, which dominated the Air Force culture.  When it 
became clear that DOD was going to acquire the missiles, the Air Force “faced an awkward 
choice: either preserve the culture at the cost of letting the army and navy have what may 
turn out to be the weapon of the century, or get on the bandwagon at the cost of modifying 
the culture.” Wilson, supra note 7, at 105.    
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resulted in a reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security.24   
In some instances, divestiture is the result of a planned incubation of 
a new regulatory function, and does not necessarily indicate dissatisfaction 
with the agency.  This was the case with federal securities regulation in the 
United States.  In the 1920s and early 1930s, the FTC used its consumer 
protection authority to challenge deception in the sale of securities.  These 
cases made the FTC the principal federal entity ensuring honesty in the 
securities market.  The FTC bolstered this role through hearings and reports 
involving the securities industry and the establishment and operation of 
public utility holding companies.  Although Congress considered assigning 
responsibility for securities regulation to the FTC, it ultimately used the 
FTC as a transitional platform for the implementation of the 1933 and 1934 
securities statutes, until the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
was set up.  As part of this plan, James Landis served a short tenure with the 
FTC before moving to the new SEC as a commissioner.     
The different ways by which agencies acquire (and sometimes lose) 
portions of their regulatory portfolio has two distinct implications.  First, 
agencies seem inevitably to acquire multiple functions and purposes, with 
their precise portfolio of responsibilities changing over time.  Whether this 
multiplicity is the result of deliberate legislative assignment, inadvertence, 
seizure of newly created policy terrain that emerges as a result of 
technological dynamism and other forms of industry change, or the periodic 
divestiture and reallocation of tasks, the reality is that purely single 
function/purpose agencies are the exception rather than the rule.  
Second, agencies will often have actual or potential rivals for control 
of specific policy making functions.  Some agencies share policy areas with 
other government bodies.  In other instances, there is a common boundary, 
and agencies periodically contest the location of the property line.  In still 
other cases (such as when technological change transforms an industry and 
its products), the property line shifts.  The process is no different than when 
a deed defines real estate ownership according to the course of a river.  A 
change in the course of the river creates predictable disputes over who owns 
what.25  Finally, agencies sometimes approach legislators to request 
                                                
24 Congressional Research Service, Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes 
After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions, Nov. 15, 2006, at  
http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/Federal%20EM%20Policy%20Changes%
20After%20Katrina.pdf  
25 In property, the boundary either moves along with the river (if the change is the 
recent of accretion) or remains where it was originally (if the change is the result of 
avulsion).  This rule explains why although the Mississippi River generally forms the 
border between Tennessee and Arkansas (with Arkansas on the east bank, and Tennessee 
on the West bank), some of the land on the west bank is in Tennessee, and other land on 
the eastern bank is in Arkansas.  See State of Arkansas v. State of Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158 
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ownership of a previously uninhabited policy area or simply seek to 
expropriate another agency’s portfolio.  Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes 
was notorious for his raids on the territory (both real and regulatory) of 
other Departments. 
Given these dynamics, it would be very useful to know which 
factors contribute to the success or failure of particular combinations, and 
the associated trade-offs.  Part III turns to this issue.  
 
III.  Who Should Do What: Seven Criteria  
 
How should we decide who should do what?  We offer seven 
criteria that reflect our reading of the mix of factors that have historically 
influenced agency design, location, and performance.26  We note at the 
                                                                                                                       
(1918).  
26 Importantly, each factor should be assessed at the level of the agency/department, 
rather than any subdivision or bureau within the agency/department.  Otherwise, the entire 
debate becomes moot, since even facially absurd combinations can look sensible if you 
drill down far enough into each agency/department’s organizational chart.  See Weisbach 
& Nissim, supra note 7, at 958-959 (“Consider, for example, a proposal to have the IRS 
run the country’s defense system, replacing the Department of Defense.  The proposal is 
not as silly as it sounds. It would not mean that bespectacled revenue agents would be 
parachuting into the Hindu Kush wearing night goggles, camouflage, and pocket 
protectors.  Instead, an intelligent Commissioner of Internal Revenue would allow his 
employees to specialize. Revenue agents would specialize in reading financial statements 
and soldiers would specialize in fighting.  Policies under such a proposal might very well 
continue much as they do today.”)   
With all due respect to Weisbach & Nissim, we think the proposal is exactly as silly as 
it sounds.  Weisbach & Nissim suggest that the main impediments to the proposal are the 
absence of benefits to coordinating tax administration and defense, and the additional costs 
of administration and oversight of two dramatically different functions.  Id.  We suspect 
that cultural differences between operators who perform these disparate functions have far 
more explanatory power for why we do not observe the imagined combination.   
Indeed, the FBI’s repeated failures in the area of domestic intelligence provide an ideal 
case study of what happens when one ignores operator culture.  See generally Richard 
Posner, Remaking Domestic Intelligence 10, 14-34 (2005).  See also Luis Garicano & 
Richard Posner, Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective, 19 J. 
Econ. Persp. 151, 166 (2005) (“If crime fighting requires a geographically decentralized 
organization with limited sharing of information and strong individual incentives based on 
outputs, but national-security intelligence requires a geographically centralized 
organization with extensive sharing of information and careful screening of inputs but low-
powered incentives, the organization’s geographical, incentive, and information-sharing 
structure will either be an unhappy compromise or assure poor performance of one of the 
two missions.”)  The Air Force is currently facing similar difficulties, in trying to adapt its 
longstanding officer-pilot based culture to the increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles.  
Mark Mazzetti, The Drone Zone, N.Y. Times M32 (July 8, 2012); David Zucchino, Drone 
pilots have a front-row seat on war, from half a world away, L. A. Times (Feb. 21, 2010); 
Rachel Martin, Drone Pilots: The Future of Aerial Warfare, NPR Nov. 29, 2011 at 
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outset that the factors are “squishy,” inter-related, and are framed at a high 
level of generality.  We offer them in the spirit of Professors David 
Weisbach and Jacob Nissim: even “relatively crude ideas. . . can help 
policymakers muddle through the problems they face.”27 
 
A.  Evaluative Criteria 
  
 1. Policy Coherence 
 
A fundamental question posed by a combination of policy duties is 
policy coherence: how related and consistent are the functions that will 
reside in the same agency? Do the functions engage the agency in the 
pursuit of a single set of internally consistent goals, or do the multiple 
functions command the agency to accomplish inconsistent or unrelated 
objectives?   
In economic terms, one can ask whether are the functions to be 
combined are complements or substitutes.  If they are complements, the 
combination has the potential to result in synergies and efficiencies; if they 
are substitutes, the combination is unlikely to result in synergies and 
efficiencies, and may actually degrade overall performance if it gives rise to 
internal disagreements over which function should be given primacy.  
Stated broadly, synergies and efficiencies are more likely to result if there 
are commonalities among the functions, whether they are derived from a 
common client population or type of regulated entity, temporal or physical 
commonalities (including but not limited to common inputs and/or outputs), 
or even just a shared intellectual framework regarding means and ends.  
To be sure, the level of generality at which policy coherence is 
assessed can result in radically different organizational outcomes.  For 
example, in 1930, the Veterans Administration (“VA”) was created by 
uniting three bureaus — the Veterans’ Bureau (which was itself created in 
1921 by combining programs offered by the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, 
the Public Health Service and the Federal Board of Vocational Education), 
the Bureau of Pensions (located in the Department of the Interior) and the 
National Homes for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers.  The common element of 
these combinations was the nature of the client population (veterans), even 
though the nature of the services being delivered to the client population 
varied tremendously (e.g., pensions, health care services, education, and 
housing/nursing home care).  But the VA does not run all programs for 
which veterans qualify; if a veteran is homeless and also has substance 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.npr.org/2011/11/29/142858358/drone-pilots-the-future-of-aerial-warfare   
27 Weisbach & Nissim, supra note 7, at 997. 
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abuse problems, the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) is responsible for the veteran’s housing issues, and the VA is 
responsible for the substance abuse issues.28   
Further, Congress need not organize services around client 
populations.  For Native Americans, Congress focused instead on the nature 
of the underlying services being delivered.  Accordingly, it allocated 
responsibility for native lands and native education to the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (in the Department of Interior), while responsibility for health care 
services rendered to the same population was vested in the Indian Health 
Service (in the Department of Health & Human Services).   
Of course, policy coherence is not necessarily of the highest priority 
– which explains why some Departments are little more than a collection of 
odds and ends.  Consider the Department of Interior, which was created in 
1849 by combining the General Land Office (from the Department of the 
Treasury), the Patent Office (from the Department of State), the Indian 
Affairs Office (from the War Department) and the military pension offices 
in the War and Navy Departments.29  Interior’s authority subsequently 
expanded to cover such functions as the census, regulation of territorial 
governments, exploration of the western United States, management of the 
jail and water systems in the District of Columbia, management of 
hospitals, universities, and public parks, and the colonization of freed slaves 
in Haiti.30  Not surprisingly, “serious observers and satirists alike regularly 
decried an absence of unifying purpose in the seemingly disparate 
collection of offices,”31 and Interior was widely described as “the 
Department of Everything Else” and the “Great Miscellany.”32  Less kindly 
disposed commentators described it as “a slop bucket for executive 
fragments,” and a “hydra-headed monster.”33  John C. Calhoun predicted 
that “everything upon the face of God’s earth will go into the Home 
Department.”34   
The Department of Commerce, which houses bureaus responsible 
for the census, patents and trademarks, weather forecasts, and weights and 
standards, has many of the same difficulties.  Former Secretary of 
                                                
28 David Brooks, What Government Does, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011.   
29 Department of Interior History, available at http://www.doi.gov/archive/history.html 
30 Id.  
31 Robert M. Utley & Barry Mackintosh, The Department of Everything Else: 
Highlights of Interior History (1989), available at 
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/utley-mackintosh/interior2.htm  
32 Id.  
33 Horace S. Merrill, William Freeman Vilas, Doctrinaire Democrat (Madison, Wisc., 
1954), pp. 134,139. 
34 Henry B. Learned, The Establishment of the Secretaryship of the Interior, 16  AM. 
HISTORICAL REV. 751, 768 (1911). 
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Commerce William Daley observed that because the Department of 
Commerce includes the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
the secretary of Commerce “spent 60 percent of his time dealing with 
fish.”35 
This dynamic can also become self-reinforcing; the less coherent the 
combination of functions in a Department to begin with, the easier it 
becomes to add the next unrelated function or functions.  Not surprisingly, 
some departments have become little more than a dumping ground (or less 
charitably, a rubbish bin) for bureaus with dissimilar portfolios.    
Even if the purposes are related, if they are at odds with one another 
the combination can lead to schizophrenia, if not outright paralysis.36  
Combining the proposed Department of Peace and Nonviolence and the 
Department of Defense is unlikely to be a good strategy, regardless of ones 
position on the optimal budget for either department.37  An agency 
responsible for both antitrust and trade will have to reconcile the belief that 
low prices are generally good (antitrust) with the belief that low prices of 
imported goods are generally bad (anti-dumping authority).  An agency 
charged with the promotion of trade (U.S. Trade Representative) will not be 
a good partner for an agency predisposed to regard trade as dumping 
(International Trade Commission).  An agency charged with the protection 
of workers (i.e., the Department of Labor) is unlikely to be a good 
combination with an agency charged with the promotion of business (i.e., 
the Department of Commerce) – making it understandable why this 
particular combination only lasted a few years, after which the Department 
of Commerce and Labor was split in two.  When President Johnson 
proposed to recombine these two departments in 1963 and again in 1964, 
the proposal went nowhere.  
Other examples of such difficulties are easy to find.  Between 1967 
and 1974, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was part of the 
Department of Transportation (DOT).  NTSB was charged with 
investigating every civil aviation accident and all significant highway, 
marine, railroad, pipeline, and hazardous-materials accidents.  In 1974, 
                                                
35 Jim Kuhnhnen, Commerce Cuts Coming in Obama’s Reorganization, AP, Jan, 29, 
2011, at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=12792513  
36 We focus on inconsistencies in ends or goals, but there can also be inconsistencies in 
preferred means, even when there is agreement on ends, at least at a high level of 
generality.   
37 See Department of Peace and Nonviolence Act, H.R. 808, 110th Cong. (2007).  The 
Department of Peace was to include offices of peace education and training, domestic and 
international peace activities, technology, arms control and disarmament, peaceful 
coexistence and nonviolent conflict resolution, and human and economic rights.   But see 
P.J. O’ROURKE, GIVE WAR A CHANCE (2002) “the Marine Corps does more to promote 
world peace than all the Ben & Jerry’s ice cream ever made.”)  
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Congress spun NTSB off from DOT in 1974 because it concluded NTSB 
could not perform its investigatory functions properly if it was part of a 
department also responsible for regulating and promoting transportation.38  
A similar dynamic explains the separation in 1974 of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (responsible for encouraging the use of nuclear power and 
regulating safety) into the Energy Research and Development 
Administration (ultimately merged into the Department of Energy, and 
charged with promoting the use of nuclear power) and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (regulating safety).39   
Similarly, until it was reorganized in the wake of the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, the Minerals Management Service in the Department of 
Interior was “charged both with collecting revenue generated by oil and gas 
drilling to fund the government, and with approving the permits that 
generate that revenue. . . [leaving the MMS] torn between whether to be a 
regulator or friend to industry.”40  The Bureau of Land Management (in the 
Department of Interior) is responsible for mining and grazing on federal 
lands, but it also houses the National Landscape Conservation System, 
whose priorities are, to say the least, quite different.   
When Congress created the Federal Reserve in 1913, its original 
mandate was to maintain price stability (i.e., to combat inflation and 
deflation).  Congress subsequently added to this mandate.  Since 1977 the 
Federal Reserve is charged with “promot[ing] effectively the goals of 
                                                
38 This background is recounted in National Transportation Safety Board, History of 
the National Transportation Safety Board, at http://ntsb.gov/about/history.html. 
39 This split solved one problem but created another.  The NRC is now far more 
susceptible to capture than was the case when it was part of a larger entity with a more 
diversified portfolio.  See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and 
Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 465 (1999); Barkow, supra 
note 7.  
40 Mark Jaffee & David Olinger, Tracking down Minerals Management Service’s 
dysfunctional history of drilling oversight, DENVER POST, June 6, 2010, at 
http://www.denverpost.com/headlines/ci_15236764.  In response to these criticisms, and 
the firestorm of Congressional disapproval that followed the Deepwater Horizon disaster, 
Secretary of the Interior Salazar reorganized MMS into three separate entities: the Bureau 
of Ocean Energy Management, which is responsible for “the sustainable development of 
the Outer Continental Shelf’s conventional and renewable energy resources, including 
resource evaluation, planning, and other activities related to leasing;” the Bureau of Safety 
and Environmental Enforcement, which is “responsible for ensuring comprehensive 
oversight, safety, and environmental protection in all offshore energy activities;” and the 
Office of Natural Resources Revenue, which is “responsible for the royalty and revenue 
management function including the collection and distribution of revenue, auditing and 
compliance, and asset management.”  Press Release, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three 
Conflicting Missions, May 19, 2010, at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Divides-MMSs-Three-Conflicting-
Missions.cfm  
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maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest 
rates.”  There is an obvious inconsistency between these goals; if price 
stability were the only priority, a zero interest rate would be the relevant 
target, but maximum employment might require a higher interest rate.41  
The dual mandate also makes the actions of the Federal Reserve less 
predictable, harder to assess critically, and more susceptible to political 
interference.42   
The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has encountered 
similar difficulties, since it is charged with “fostering air commerce,” as 
well as safety.43  According to a former DOT Inspector General, the FAA 
has generally responded by favoring commerce at the expense of safety.44  
When the issue attracted public attention, Congress responded by modifying 
the dual mandate, but the change had limited impact on the culture of the 
FAA.45   
Similar conflicting mandates also help explain why the problems 
with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac got as bad as they did.  As former-
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers noted, “the illusion that the 
companies were doing virtuous work made it impossible to build a political 
case for serious regulation. When there were social failures the companies 
always blamed their need to perform for the shareholders. When there were 
business failures it was always the result of their social obligations.”46  
Stated more broadly, a department with multiple mandates can come up 
                                                
41 Ben Bernanke, Federal Reserve Communications, Nov. 14, 2007, at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20071114a.htm  
(“Were price stability the only objective mandated for the Federal Reserve, the FOMC 
presumably would strive to achieve zero inflation. . . But under the Federal Reserve's dual 
mandate, the determination of the appropriate long-run inflation rate must take account of 
factors that may affect the efficient functioning of the economy at very low rates of 
inflation. . . [t]hus, the (properly measured) long-run inflation rate that best promotes the 
dual mandate is likely to be low but not zero.”)  
42 George F. Will, The Trap of the Federal Reserve’s Dual Mandate, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 18, 2010 (“The Fed cannot perform such a fundamentally political function and 
forever remain insulated from politics. Only repeal of the dual mandate can rescue the Fed 
from the ruinous - immediately to its reputation; eventually to its independence - role as the 
savior of the economy, or of any distressed sector (e.g., housing) that clamors for lower 
interest rates.”)  
43 MARY SCHIAVO FLYING BLIND, FLYING SAFE 51 (1997). 
44 Id. at 65 (“If outsiders viewed the FAA as encumbered by a divided loyalty and 
hamstrung by its dual mandate, the FAA didn’t seem to share that confusion.  The 
tombstone mindset made plain its loyalty to the cost-conscious interests of the aviation 
industry.”)   
45 Id. at 203, 206.   
46 Lawrence Summers, You Want Creative Capitalism? Try This, 195, 196 in 
CREATIVE CAPITALISM: A CONVERSATION WITH BILL GATES, WARREN BUFFETT, AND 
OTHER ECONOMIC LEADERS (Michael Kinsley & Conor Clarke, eds.) (2008).    
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with a plausible justification for almost any decision under the sun.    
One should not overstate the necessity for consistency within a 
single department or agency, since sound policy-making usually requires 
the balancing of competing interests.  Consider banking regulation, where 
solvency must be balanced against consumer protection.  If solvency and 
consumer protection are handled by distinct agencies, each will focus on the 
areas within their respective domains, and either discount or ignore entirely 
the other’s area of responsibility.  Yet, that approach is a recipe for regular 
battles between the agencies as to which should prevail on an issue that 
implicates both sets of interests.  A decision balancing the relevant 
considerations will eventually have to be made by someone – either within 
a single agency, if both functions are combined, or at a higher level if the 
two (or more) involved agencies are unable to agree amongst themselves.  
Obviously, the mission and location of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”), and the reorganization of MMS raise these issues in a 
very concrete way.47  
The problem gets stickier when the interests that must be balanced 
fall in different legal domains, or are incommensurable.  Consider the risks 
(whether real or hypothetical) posed to endangered species and the general 
population by military training and technology.48  If DOD is put in charge 
of deciding whether military training/technology is more important than the 
risks created by such training/technology, it will predictably focus on the 
benefits, and decide accordingly.  If Interior or EPA get to decide the same 
dispute, they will predictably focus on the risks of training/technology, and 
                                                
47 The press release announcing the reorganization of MMS highlights the benefits of 
avoiding agencies with conflicting missions – but it says nothing about the necessity of 
integrating the conflicting decisions that will result from separate agencies.  See Press 
Release, supra note 40 (“‘The Minerals Management Service has three distinct and 
conflicting missions that – for the benefit of effective enforcement, energy development, 
and revenue collection – must be divided,’ said Secretary Salazar. ‘The reorganization I am 
ordering today is the next step in our reform agenda and will enable us to carry out these 
three separate and equally-important missions with greater effectiveness and 
transparency.’”)  
48 See, e.g., State of Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 736 F.2nd 438 (7th Cir. 1984) (dispute 
over whether the Department of Defense was required to prepare a supplemental 
environmental impact statement pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act with 
respect to construction of a new extremely low frequency (“ELF”) submarine 
communications system based in Michigan and upgrading of ELF system in Wisconsin 
when new information was available on the biological effects of ELF).  A similar dispute 
raged over the use of Vieques Island as a bombing range by the U.S. Navy.  See, e.g., 
Edward Walsh, Despite protest, Navy resumes bombing exercises on Vieques/Training 
interrupted briefly -- 14 arrests, Wash. Post, Apr. 28, 2001 (“The Navy resumed practice 
bombing on the small Puerto Rican island of Vieques yesterday, intensifying a debate that 
has pitted what the Navy says is the vital need for realistic training exercises against the 
health concerns of the island's population and the Puerto Rican government.”)   
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decide accordingly.  Similarly, if there is an environmental issue on a 
military base, DOD and EPA are likely to have very different assessments 
of the seriousness of the problem.49  The dispute over the Keystone XL 
pipeline provides another example of this phenomenon; the Department of 
State found no material environmental problems with the project, and 
Secretary of State Clinton stated that she was “inclined” to approve it – but 
EPA had a dramatically different perspective on the environmental risks, 
and was viewed by project supporters as a “de facto ally of 
environmentalists.”50  Similar dynamics play out across other domains, 
including the balancing of environmental protection against nuclear energy, 
balancing industrial development (and the associated employment) against 
population health and environmental justice claims, and so on.51 
Thus, which agency is the “decider” will significantly affect the 
outcome of any given dispute, as well as whether particular circumstances 
count as “disputes.”  Stated differently, despite the rhetoric that typically 
surrounds reorganization, the issue is not just about process efficiencies – it 
is also about outcomes.  
 
 2.  Credibility/Branding  
                                                
49 Lyndsey Layton, Pentagon Fights EPA on Pollution Cleanup, WASH. POST, June 30, 
2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/29/AR2008062901977.html.   
50 See Secretary Clinton speaks about Innovation and American Leadership, 
http://newsblaze.com/story/20101017130926stat.nb/topstory.html (“[W]e've not yet signed 
off on it. But we are inclined to do so and we are for several reasons - going back to one of 
your original questions - we're either going to be dependent on dirty oil from the Gulf or 
dirty oil from Canada.”); Elana Schor, Canada-U.S. Oil Pipeline Poses Few Environmental 
Risks -- State Dept., N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2011 (“Among the entities that now could 
scrutinize the document during a 90-day comment period are other federal agencies -- 
including EPA, which called for more in-depth review of the project's footprint in June 
comments that called an earlier EIS ‘insufficient.’  That stance has led some green groups 
to look to EPA to expose any potential flaws they might see in the final EIS, while some of 
the pipeline's supporters view the agency as a de facto ally of environmentalists.  Robert 
Jones, vice president of the Keystone pipeline system at TransCanada, said earlier this 
month that ‘I want to be responsive" to EPA's concerns, but "the frustration I have is that I 
might as well be talking to NRDC or the Sierra Club.’”) 
51 See HOWARD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITIONS AND POWER: THE DYNAMICS OF 
FEDERAL ORGANIZATION (5th ed. 1998) (“If agencies are to work together harmoniously, 
they must share at least some community of interests about basic goals. . . Senator Frank 
Moss ascribed the conflict between the National Park Service and the Army Corps of 
Engineers over the Florida Everglades to ‘uncoordinated activities.  Park service officials 
complained that the engineers drained the Everglades National Park almost dry in their 
efforts to halt wetlands flooding and reclaim glade country for agriculture.  The Army 
Corps of Engineers argued that wetlands were ‘for the birds’ and flood control for the 
people.”)   




A public agency’s “brand” conveys a message about the agency’s 
priorities and aims to both internal and external constituencies.  The brand 
can become diluted and/or confused if the agency has too many 
responsibilities, or if the responsibilities are not complementary and 
consistent.  For agency insiders, a diluted/confused brand can create 
confusion about what projects ought to be selected, what theory ought to 
motivate the pursuit of individual matters, and the relative priority and 
seriousness of particular projects/matters.52  A diluted/confused brand can 
also affect the agency’s decision rules: personnel working for an agency 
with a diluted/confused brand will find it easier to adopt amorphous 
standards and employ ad hoc reasoning when justifying their decisions.53  A 
diluted/confused brand can also distract the agency from its core mission, 
and may even affect the culture of the agency.  Those who interact with an 
agency with a diluted/confused brand are more likely to complain that it 
operates inconsistently and unreliably. 
These branding dynamics also influence agency credibility.  The 
better the reputation an agency has with Congress and congressional 
staffers, the more likely it is to receive adequate funding, and not be 
subjected to routine second-guessing/reversal.  The better the reputation an 
agency has with courts, the greater the deference it is likely to receive for its 
decisions.  The better the reputation an agency has with the parties it 
regulates, the more likely it is to be able to work out a cost-effective 
solution in a timely way, without resorting to full-blown adversarial 
proceedings.  
Although credibility obviously depends on multiple factors, 
including the particulars of the involved agencies, and their respective 
histories and past decisions, the bundling of functions influences an 
agency’s reservoir of political capital.  Regulatory bodies are continually 
                                                
52 Cf. Wilson, supra note 7, at 55-59 (describing how the Economic Cooperation 
Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency were profoundly affected by the 
personnel they acquired from other agencies, given the open-ended nature of the original 
mandate (i.e. the brand) for each agency).  Indeed, as Wilson concisely observes, “if a new 
agency has ambiguous goals, the employees’ prior experience will influence how its tasks 
get defined.”)  Id. at 55. 
53 See Summers, supra note 46; Janice Revell, Interview with John Taylor, Money 
Magazine 93, 96 (Aug. 2012) (“The Fed needs to focus on a single goal of long-run price 
stability.  We should remove the Fed’s dual mandate of maximum employment and stable 
prices, which was put into effect in the 1970s.  From 2003 to 2005, the Fed held interests 
rates too low for too long.  A primary reason was its concern that raising rates would 
increase unemployment. . . More recently, the Fed has cited concerns over employment to 
to justify its interventions, including quantitatitive easing.  Removing the dual mandate 
would take away that excuse.”) (emphasis supplied).   
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engaged in a process of accumulating and spending political capital.  
Combining a function that generates political capital surpluses with a 
function that runs political capital deficits may give an agency greater 
ability to perform deficit-prone functions that are important to the larger 
economy.  Conversely, an agency whose portfolio of responsibilities 
ensures that it always runs a political deficit is an agency that has no 
constituency.  The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is 
a case study of precisely this phenomenon.54 
Such considerations help explain why agencies sometimes resist the 
addition of new responsibilities, even when acceptance would result in a 
greater budget and more visibility.  For several decades, the FBI vigorously 
resisted attempts to expand its jurisdiction to encompass federal drug 
laws.55  The State Department did not want the United States Information 
Agency and the Agency for International Development.56  On at least two 
occasions, the Secret Service declined requests from the CIA to spy on 
visiting foreign dignitaries.57 
A similar dynamic explains why agencies sometimes try to get rid of 
responsibilities that senior agency personnel believe detract from the 
agency’s core mission.  In 1973 and again in 1974, the Department of 
Agriculture tried to get rid of responsibility for the Food Stamp program, 
since it viewed itself as being in the “food business” – not the “welfare 
business.”58  As these examples indicate, agency personnel have complex 
interests and incentives, and do not simply seek to grow their domains and 
budgets. 
Another factor affecting an agency’s brand and credibility is its 
susceptibility to capture.  In general, the broader an agency’s portfolio, the 
harder it is to capture, since all of the covered industries must bid against 
one another to capture the regulator.  This dynamic may raise the price of 
capture so high as to make it no longer cost-effective for any given industry 
or market participant to attempt to do so.  Thus, the Interstate Commerce 
                                                
54 See Susan E. Dudley, Lessons Learned, Challenges Ahead: Is There a Constituency 
for OIRA, REGULATION 7-8 (Summer, 2009) (“OIRA’s mandate is to advance the general 
public interest. . . Hence there is no concentrated constituency for OIRA.”)  
55 Wilson, supra note 7, at 180 (“For years members of Congress tried to persuade J. 
Edgar Hoover that the FBI should take over federal responsibility for investigating drug 
trafficking.”)   
56 Id. 
57 Marc Ambinder, Inside the Secret Service, HARPERS, Mar. 2011, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/03/inside-the-secret-service/8390/  
(“over the past 10 years, the CIA had asked the service on at least two occasions to help 
develop intelligence on a visiting foreign leader—that is, essentially, to spy on the very 
person it was assigned to protect. Both times, the service refused.”) 
58 Wilson, supra note 7, at 108-109. 
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Commission (ICC) was much harder for a single industry to capture, 
because it covered both trucking and railroads, compared to the dynamic in 
financial services, where Congress allocated responsibility for regulating 
insurers, banks, and securities to entirely separate regulators.  (We leave to 
the side the question of whether the ICC performed well or poorly; our 
point is simply about the relative likelihood of capture).  The EPA presents 
a similar dynamic; because it is responsible for pollution of the air, water, 
and land, it is harder for polluters in a single industry to capture the agency.  
To be sure, the prospect of capture may be the whole point of creating an 
agency in the first place.  
   
3. Capacity/Capability 
 
Agency resources are scarce, just like everything else.  Assigning N 
+1 functions to an agency that only has the resources (whether measured by 
headcount, band-width, or credibility) to handle N responsibilities is asking 
for trouble.  Stated differently, an agency with multiple discrete functions 
can easily find itself with too many things to do, relative to the pool of 
talent that it has available.  One needs a critical mass of talent to do any one 
thing well; to do multiple things well requires both sufficient capacity and 
continuous fine-tuning of the agency’s allocation of resources.59  Absent 
such conditions, agencies will necessarily give superficial treatment to areas 
that, at any particular point in time, are deemed less central to the agency’s 
mission.    Agency employees are not stupid, and will respond accordingly, 
sorting themselves to work in particular areas – with their choices dictated 
by their ambition and enthusiasm.  The result is that some areas will 
flourish and others will languish – even if budgets keep pace with new 
responsibilities (which they almost never do). 
Congress already has a tendency to assign new responsibilities to 
existing agencies without providing much in the way of additional funding.  
For example, expansions in the responsibilities of the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) have not been accompanied by similar expansions 
in funding.60  To be sure, there will always be competition for resources, 
                                                
59 Wilson, supra note 7, at 378 (“[W]e live in a country that despite its baffling array 
of rules and regulations and the insatiable desire of some people to use government to 
rationalize society still makes it possible to get drinkable water instantly, put through a 
telephone call in seconds, deliver a letter in a day, and obtain a passport in a week. . . One 
can stand on the deck of an aircraft carrier during night flight operations and watch two 
thousand nineteen-year-old boys faultlessly operate one of the most complex organizational 
systems ever created.  There are not many places where all this happens.  It is astonishing 
that it can be made to happen at all.”) 
60 See, e.g., Ladd Wiley & Steven A. Grossman, Does FDA Have Enough Funding to 
Fulfill its Critical Role in Protecting the Public Health? 1 FDLI FOOD AND DRUG POLICY 
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regardless of how many functions an agency performs.  But, combining 
functions within a single department does not eliminate the problem.  
Instead, it is merely shifted to a less transparent setting for resolution.  
The funding/resource allocation problem noted above will 
necessarily be less visible if it is resolved within a single agency.  The 
agency will present a funding request that reflects its internal resolution of 
the budgetary fight, and its assessment of its overall priorities.  The same 
dynamic applies to the allocation of effort within the agency.  Barring a 
whistle-blower, external constituencies will never learn the details of who 
wanted what – and what is no longer being done with the same enthusiasm, 
if at all.  If the funding debate involved multiple agencies, there would be a 
higher degree of transparency, since each agency would be required to make 
its case individually.61    
Capacity is not the same thing as capability.  Capability determines 
whether an agency has the tools to make good decisions, and does so.  An 
agency with enforcement responsibilities first needs the statutory authority 
to exercise its will, and an adequate set of remedies with which to enforce 
compliance.  Once it is so armed, it will predictably make two types of 
errors: Type I (intervening when it should not, or a false-positive), and Type 
II (not intervening when it should, or a false negative).  The institutional 
design question is whether an agency with multiple (and potentially 
competing) functions and purposes is likely to make more or fewer mistakes 
– and perhaps, of which type.  In principle, both types of error are equally 
problematic; it is the overall frequency of error that matters.  In practice, 
false positives are viewed as more problematic than false negatives, since 
they are more visible, and the aggrieved constituency can readily mobilize 
in opposition.  Such issues should be considered in deciding how to allocate 
regulatory authority.   
A related point concerns the agency’s own ambitions. Expansion of 
the agency’s substantive mandate can degrade capability.  As the agency’s 
authority grows, its leadership and staff may acquire an exaggerated sense 
of the institution’s ability to perform effectively, and pay less attention to 
whether the agency’s commitments match its capabilities.  These 
circumstances can result in agency leadership “over-promising and under-
delivering.”   
                                                                                                                       
FORUM (2011).   
61 To be sure, the budgeting process is not fully transparent.  If the Administration 
decides not to include funding for an initiative that agency personnel would like to pursue, 
Congress may never learn of that fact.  Agency personnel are not allowed to request from 
Congress a budgetary allocation in excess of the amount in the Administration’s budget – 
which can lead to considerable frustration during Congressional hearings, if the recent fight 
over the funding of the Consumer Product Safety Commission is any indication.   
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A second problem arises from legislative perceptions that the 
breadth of an agency’s mandate gives it the capability to address all 
troublesome phenomena.  The more expansive an agency’s mandate, the 
more likely it is that Congress will turn to the agency to address 
developments that do not fit neatly elsewhere – even if those problems do 
not actually play to an agency’s strengths.  Thus, an agency with expansive 
powers becomes a default option for handling the latest problem, regardless 
of whether the agency’s actual capacity and capabilities supply effective 
means for achieving a good solution. 
More broadly, inadequate capacity forces a bureau or agency to set 
priorities (and accordingly, triage the issues in its regulatory portfolio).  
Some issues will receive close attention, while others will only get attention 
in response to complaints or crises.  Such triage is necessary if the agency is 
to keep its head above water, but it means that “law in action” is quite 
different than “law on the books.”  It is also a recipe for recriminations and 
oversight hearings when an issue on the losing end of the triage process 
blows up in the face of the agency.  The FDA’s attempts to do both food 
and drug safety provide an obvious example of how this sequence can play 
out.62   
Capability is also influenced by the degree to which agency 
personnel self-critically assess both means and ends.  When multiple 
agencies share responsibility for a particular area, there is a feedback loop 
for surfacing and resolving disagreements regarding such matters.  When a 
single agency has sole responsibility, and seeks to handle such matters 
internally, the risks of groupthink and tunnel vision increase.  Conversely, 
the increased transparency that results from two agencies disagreeing on 
such matters lowers these risks – particularly if those on the “losing” side of 
the dispute are willing to leak the information, as is often the case.   
For example, the Departments of State and the CIA have been at 
odds over the use of drones in Pakistan.  In one recent incident, the 
ambassador sought to postpone a strike for what he believed to be good 
reasons, but was overruled by the CIA director, for what he believed to be 
good reasons.63  Reasonable people can disagree as to whether the CIA or 
the Department of State had the better of the argument in this particular 
case, but it seems clear that the dispute was much less likely to come to 
                                                
62 AP, Risks of tainted food rise as inspections drop, Feb. 26, 2007, at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17349427/ns/health-infectious_diseases/t/risks-tainted-
food-rise-inspections-drop/  
63 Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Tightens Drone Rules, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2011, at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204621904577013982672973836.html?m
od=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories.    
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light if the issue was being decided by (and within) a single entity than 
when two agencies/departments with different views were involved.     
 
4. Resilience: Is the Assignment of Functions Adaptable and 
Sustainable? 
 
Statutes routinely allocate jurisdiction according to the technology 
used to supply a product or the status of the organization that provides the 
service.  What happens when the character of the industry is altered by 
technological change or the emergence of new categories of suppliers of the 
sector’s goods or services?  As suggested earlier, regulatory jurisdictional 
boundaries can shift over time in much the way that the movement of a 
river will sometimes alter rights in real property.64  When such changes take 
place, multiple agencies may seek to exercise authority by arguing that the 
reconfigured industry falls within their purview.  A sustainable assignment 
of functions will be able to adapt to such changes; a non-sustainable 
assignment will not – making bureaucratic warfare between the rival 
agencies a very real possibility.65      
One obvious example is the almost decade-long dispute between the 
SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) over 
products that arose at the interface of regulatory authority of these two 
agencies.  The SEC regulates securities; the CFTC regulates futures 
contracts.  But what happens when a futures contract is for the delivery of 
securities?  The SEC took the logical (and self-interested) position that a 
futures contract involving a security was subject to its jurisdiction.  The 
CFTC took the logical (and self-interested) position that it had exclusive 
jurisdiction over all futures contracts.  Both agencies pointed to their 
enabling legislation.  When the CFTC approved the Chicago Board of 
Trade’s trading of futures contracts on GNMA certifications and the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s trading of futures contracts on T-bills, the 
SEC took the position that it might view such trading as illegal, 
notwithstanding the CFTC’s approval.  The Chicago Board of Trade 
brought a lawsuit against the SEC, challenging its assertion of jurisdiction.66  
The SEC also brought several lawsuits challenging the CFTC’s assertion of 
                                                
64 Whether the property right moves with the course of the water depends on whether 
the movement was the result of avulsion (no change in property right) or accretion (change 
in property right).   
65 Cf. DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM 
JURISDICTION 2 (1997) (“As with nations and hunting groups, poorly defined boundaries 
lead to wasteful skirmishes.”)  
66 Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 
1026 (1982) 
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exclusive jurisdiction.67  The dispute was finally settled with a negotiated 
agreement between the two agencies, which was ultimately enacted into 
formal law. 
The regulation of financial services routinely raises this problem, 
because regulatory authority is generally tied to the type of entity being 
regulated, rather than the type of product being offered.  Consider the 
comments of a Federal Deposition Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) 
associate director, noting the complexities of determining whether a 
particular depository institution was indeed a bank: 
First, you have to figure out, what in the hell is a bank?  
And what is the intent of deposit insurance?  It’s a far cry 
from when they set it up.  A typical commercial bank was 
one that made agricultural loans, commercial loans, and held 
demand deposits. . . Congress had in mind what a bank was. . 
. Now you may have a furniture company and they may say 
“we will sell a lot of couches on credit, and we borrow 
money to do that.  We could [finance the credit] with 
commercial paper, but by and large we use a commercial 
bank for our needs. . . Why don’t I establish a bank and get 
insurance. . . I could go out and sell CDs. . . Then I’ve got 
back up and my financing rates go way down. . . Now I am a 
lender for couches; instead of selling the loans to the bank or 
borrowing, I just put the loans on my books.”  Well that isn’t 
what anyone was thinking of or imagined at first. . . They get 
deposit insurance and they play on the federal guarantee to 
reduce interest costs and financing.68 
    
Such border disputes can easily trigger a turf war between agencies.  These 
dynamics are also affected by the demand side, as firms maneuver to 
“choose” their regulator.   
An adaptive regulatory framework would have clearly allocated 
regulatory authority over a particular area to a specific regulatory agency -- 
instead of forcing personnel at multiple agencies to spend considerable time 
and effort disputing the allocation of responsibility.  Various strategies are 
available to proactively address adaptability, but to a considerable degree, 
Congress only examines such matters in response to train wrecks and crises, 
in which perceived and/or real failures in the regulatory process give rise to 
reassessment.  Dodd-Frank presents an obvious example of the end game of 
                                                
67 SEC v. American Commodity Exchange, 546 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1976); SEC v. 
Univest, Inc., 410 F. Supp 1029 (D. Ill. 1976). 
68 ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, CHECKING ON BANKS: AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
THREE FEDERAL AGENCIES 126-127 (1996). 
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this dynamic – albeit one that did not provide a resilient solution to the 
broader problem it sought to address, with the exception of creating the 
CFPB.   
Resilience is obviously not as important as some of the other factors, 
because problems will emerge, if at all, over time.  But, the absence of 
properly defined jurisdictional boundaries will eventually lead to border 
wars between agencies/departments, and turf wars among congressional 
committees.  Creating an adaptable and sustainable grant of regulatory 
authority helps reduce the amount of time spent on such activities.  
 
5. Internal Organizational Cohesion 
  
When discrete functions are combined in a single agency or 
department, the result is usually the creation of separate operating units for 
each function.  As individual operating units become more specialized and 
autonomous, they quickly develop norms, goals, and priorities that 
predictably differ from other units in the same agency or department.  Over 
time, this process results in units being staffed by personnel whose interests, 
training, and abilities focus narrowly on the work of their unit and have 
little understanding of the backgrounds and activities of other units 
underneath the same institutional roof.  Predictably enough, each individual 
operating unit starts to see the other units as rivals for prestige, headcount, 
and budgetary resources.   
This rivalry can be beneficial if it results in synergies that serve the 
larger aims of the agency.  Conversely, the rivalry will be destructive if it 
manifests itself in credit-claiming or other measures designed to enhance 
the visibility of the operating unit as an end in itself.  The third possibility is 
there will be neither beneficial nor destructive rivalry; individual units will 
simply not acknowledge the existence of the other units.  Issues of culture 
and history loom large in determining which of these three outcomes will 
result.   
To be sure, such difficulties are likely to arise whether we are 
dealing with a single agency or multiple agencies that are expected to 
coordinate their efforts.  And, such difficulties can exist within a single 
department: consider the intra-service rivalries in the U.S. Air Force 
(bomber v. fighter pilots) and the U.S. Navy (surface navy v. aviators v. 
submarines).69  But, matters are often much worse across divisions within a 
single agency or department, such as the legendary conflicts between the 
rival military services contained within a single Department of Defense: 
                                                
69 More colloquially, these are referred to as the brown shoe, black shoe, and felt shoe 
Navy. Wilson, supra note 7, at 106.   




It was the late 1950s and General Curtis LeMay was the 
Chief of Staff of the Air Force.  The Air Force and the Navy 
at that time were vying for who would have the primary 
mission of the strategic defense of the country.  The Air 
Force was advocating its land based strategic bombers and 
intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The Navy was advocating 
its ballistic missile submarines and putting nuclear capable 
aircraft aboard aircraft carriers.  The debate was heated and 
there was not enough money to do both.  The future missions 
of both services were at stake.  An Air Force Colonel was 
briefing General LeMay on the Soviet threat versus the 
strategic requirements funded in the budget.  The Colonel 
told General LeMay that the Russians, our enemy, were 
capable of . . . and at that point General LeMay stopped him.  
LeMay was quoted as saying, “The Russians are our 
adversary.  The Navy is our enemy.”70 
   
LeMay’s assessment echoes in another story of institutional narrow-
mindedness that circulates in the folklore of World War II.  In this story, a 
journalist interviews a Marine Corps pilot after VJ Day in 1945.  The 
exchange goes like this: 
 
Journalist: “What was the enemy like in the Pacific?” 
Marine Corps pilot: “Terrible.”   
Journalist: “What do you mean, terible?”   
Marine Corps pilot.  “They were savage, merciless, and 
relentless.  Every time we thought we had them beat, they’d do 
something despicable and underhanded, and we’d have to start over 
again.” 
Journalist: “It must have been a relief to hear that Japan had 
surrendered.” 
Marine Corps pilot: “Japan? I was talking about the U.S. Navy!” 
 
Other examples of inter-service attitudes (and their consequences) 
are not hard to find.  The Air Force is responsible for close air support of 
ground operations, but, air force culture is “based on flying high-
performance fighters and long-range bombers, especially the latter.”71  Not 
surprisingly, the Air Force historically gave “minimal attention to close air 
                                                
70 John Melchner, Managing the Budget Process, J. PUB. INTEGRITY 11, 13 
(Fall/Winter, 1998), available at  http://www.ignet.gov/randp/jpifw98.pdf.  
71 Wilson, supra note 7, at 186. 
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support and buys just enough attack aircraft to protect its claim to the close 
air support mission.  Meanwhile, the Army, unsure that it can rely on Air 
Force support when it is needed, purchases a vast fleet of attack helicopters 
which, while more expensive than attack planes and potentially far more 
vulnerable, can be placed under direct Army command.”72  When U.S. 
armed forces invaded Grenada in 1983, there were problems with the 
interoperability of communications systems between Marines in the north 
and Army Rangers in the south: “since their radios could not communicate 
with the ships of the Independence battle group, Army radiomen were 
forced to send their request for fire support to Fort Bragg which in turn 
relayed them by satellite to the ships.”73   
Stated more broadly, the coordination of functions and 
responsibilities will not happen merely because previously separate bureaus 
are combined into a single department.74  Indeed, the more each bureau 
attempts to build esprit de corps and signal that it is truly elite, the less 
likely “joint-ness” will result.  Such dynamics have long complicated 
attempts to deploy “special ops” teams from different branches of the 
military in an integrated fashion – particularly when one adds in that special 
ops has collectively been long regarded with collective suspicion by the 
“regular” military.  When one adds the CIA into the mix, it is easy to 
understand why joint-ness has been such a challenge – although there have 
been significant improvements in recent years.75      
                                                
72 RICHARD A. STUBBING, THE DEFENSE GAME 142 (1986) 
73 http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/urgfury.pdf.  In the Hollywood version, a 
Marine squad was in danger of being overrun, and was unable to request air support 
because its radio had been destroyed.  A young Marine (played by Mario Van Peebles) 
patched together a phone line, and placed a call to Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, using 
a credit card that he had carried into battle.  The call was relayed to a Navy ship stationed 
off Grenada, which coordinated the necessary close air support.  See Heartbreak Ridge 
(1986).    
74 See, e.g., DENNIS D. RILEY & BRYAN E. BROPHY-BAERMANN, BUREAUCRACY AND 
THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 71 (2006) (“A specialist in marine biology may in some 
sense work for the Department of Commerce, but in his or her mind, the job is not with the 
Commerce Department or even with the NOAA, but with the National Marine Fisheries 
Service.”)  
 
75 Marc Ambinder, The Secret Team that Killed Bin Laden, NATIONAL J. May 3, 2011, 
at http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/the-secret-team-that-killed-bin-laden-
20110502 (“Sunday’s operation provides strong evidence that the CIA and JSOC work 
well together. . . In an interview at CIA headquarters two weeks ago, a senior 
intelligence official said the two proud groups of American secret warriors had been 
“deconflicted and basically integrated” -- finally -- 10 years after 9/11.”); Greg Miller & 
Julie Tate, CIA Shifts Focus to Killing Targets, WASH. POST, Sep 1, 2011 at A1 (“The CIA 
was heavily involved in the raid by U.S. Special Operations troops on a compound in 
Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May.  Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Navy SEALs, but the 
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In like fashion, the CIA has had a long-standing cultural conflict 
between analysts and field agents, as well as ongoing debates between 
internal communities that favor either reliance on high technology 
monitoring systems (e.g., reconnaissance satellites) or “Humint” (on the 
ground in-person collection of intelligence).  Those who design and manage 
intelligence gathering through advanced technology systems tend to have 
backgrounds in science and engineering.  The human intelligence 
community tends to be drawn from individuals with skills in the social 
sciences.  Not surprisingly, each individual unit believes it has a monopoly 
(or near-monopoly) on the optimal approach to intelligence gathering and 
analysis, and the efforts of other units are viewed with disdain.  
The problem is not limited to the uniformed services: the U.S. Forest 
Service has experienced similar difficulties as it has expanded from an 
agency staffed solely by foresters to a more diversified ecosystem.  As 
James Q. Wilson observed, “today foresters have to contend with engineers, 
biologists, and economists, among others.  The foresters dislike the 
tendency of engineers to elevate mechanical soundness over natural beauty, 
of biologists to worry more about endangered species than about big game, 
and of economists to put a price on things foresters regard as priceless.”76   
As these examples illustrate, the combination of related functions 
within a single department or agency does not mean that good things will 
inevitably result.  Indeed, destructive rivalry can mean that 2+2 = 1, instead 
of 4.   
 
6. Collateral Effects on the Regulatory Ecosystem 
 
The government is already thickly planted with bureaus, agencies 
and inter-agency working groups, departments and commissions. Many of 
these institutions have overlapping authority – sometimes by reason of 
deliberate legislative choice and sometimes by accident.  As noted 
previously, in some instances shared authority stems from conscious 
congressional decisions to dedicate policymaking responsibilities to two or 
                                                                                                                       
operation was carried out under CIA authority, planned in a room at agency headquarters 
and based on intelligence gathered over a period of years by the CTC.  
The assault was the most high-profile example of an expanding collaboration between 
the CIA and the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, which oversees the nation’s elite 
military teams.  Their comingling at remote bases is so complete that U.S. officials ranging 
from congressional staffers to high-ranking CIA officers said they often find it difficult to 
distinguish agency from military personnel. ‘You couldn’t tell the difference between CIA 
officers, Special Forces guys and contractors,” said a senior U.S. official after a recent tour 
through Afghanistan. “They’re all three blended together. All under the command of the 
CIA.’”) 
76 Wilson, supra note 7, at 65.   
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more public bodies.  Sometimes the deliberate duplication of responsibility 
stems from Congressional desire to test alternative institutional means of 
delivering a desired policy result.77  On other occasions it reflects an 
explicit desire to use interagency rivalry to spur performance 
improvements.78  Finally, as we describe below, technological change and 
market developments can give rise to regulatory overlaps “by accident.”  
Whatever the origins, the fact of overlapping authority typically 
elicits effort by the agencies with shared jurisdiction to coordinate their 
efforts.  These efforts do not arise because the agencies in question like 
each other.  In many circumstances, rivalry among agencies to be seen as 
the lead institution in a given field of regulation is inevitable, as perceptions 
of primacy influence congressional decisions about budgets, affect the 
recruitment of skilled staff, and generally shape the agency’s self-image.  In 
analyzing the conduct of public institutions, one rarely goes wrong by 
overestimating the power of parochialism and self-interest to warp 
behavior. 
Even though agencies with contested or contestable functions 
compete aggressively with each other, they often come to realize the need, 
at least on some level, to avoid destructive duplication and to invest in joint 
activities to deliver better policy results.   The means of cooperation and 
coordination are myriad, and range from formal exchange of written 
instruments (e.g., memoranda of understanding) to the creation of 
interagency working groups to less formal (but still important) personal 
interaction among agency heads, senior managers, and case handlers.  In 
ways that are sometimes visible but more often invisible to external 
observers, agencies with overlapping authority and responsibilities routinely 
create a vibrant and interlocking ecosystem of cooperation.   
When regulatory tasks are reallocated, or a new agency is inserted 
into the mix, or new powers are given to an existing agency, there is a 
significant potential to disrupt this regulatory ecosystem.  Disruption can 
take a variety of forms.  The new entrant may siphon off money and 
                                                
77 This is probably the best interpretation of the decision of Congress in 1914 to 
establish the FTC and to give the Commission concurrent authority with the Department of 
Justice over the Clayton Act.  The decision permitted a test of the relative efficacy of 
competition policymaking through administrative elaboration by a multimember 
commission (the FTC model) versus litigation in the federal courts by a single-headed 
executive branch body (the Justice Department model).  See William E. Kovacic, 
Downsizing Antitrust: Is It Time to End Dual Federal Enforcement? 41 ANTITRUST 
BULLETIN 505 (1996). 
78 See William E. Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid 
Protest Disputes, 9 ADMIN. LAW J. AM. UNIV. 461 (1995) (discussing congressional 
decision in 1980s to give General Services Board of Contract Appeals broader bid protest 
authority and create an alternative to protest oversight by the General Accounting Office).   
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personnel, making it difficult for incumbent agencies to perform their 
existing responsibilities.  Reallocation of authority may also upset long-
standing understandings that formed the basis for fruitful inter-agency 
collaboration. The entrant may receive a substantive mandate whose formal 
commands resemble the language that appears in the statutes of other 
regulatory authorities.  The interpretation of the new entrant’s mandate in 
one judicial could spill over into the interpretation of the mandates of other 
agencies in separate cases.  
To be sure, Congress certainly has the authority to close down an 
agency entirely, or substantially limit its jurisdiction and authority – and it 
knows how to do that when it wants to.  But, the kinds of regulatory 
reorganizations we have been describing usually do not reflect that 
objective – meaning that the damage to the regulatory ecosystem is often an 
unintended consequence of Congressional failure to understand that 
personnel would migrate to the new and more glamorous and higher paying 
outpost – leaving other parts of the regulatory ecosystem permanently 
blighted.  To summarize, the wisdom and net functional benefits of any 
specific realignment of regulatory authority will depend heavily upon 
whether the changes build upon a sophisticated understanding of the 
existing regulatory ecology.  
 
7. Political Implications 
  
Politics is a major factor in the design and location of government 
agencies and functions.  When the House of Representatives was 
considering a climate change bill in 2009, the chair of the House 
Agriculture Committee made it clear he would kill the bill if it allocated 
responsibility for determining whether farmers would receive credit for 
“tilling and conservation practices that keep carbon dioxide stored in the 
soil” to the EPA, but would allow it to proceed if responsibility for the same 
task resided in the Agriculture Department.79  The choice of location had 
real significance; “environmentalists and the bill's main sponsors feared that 
the Agriculture Department might use lax standards, which would blow a 
                                                
79 Derek Thompson, The Collin Peterson Climate Change Compromise, THE 
ATLANTIC, available at 
http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/06/the_collin_peterson_climate_change_compromise_
1.php (“So it looks like the Waxman-Markey climate change bill will pass in the House this 
week: The sponsors hammered out an agreement last night with Collin Peterson, the chair 
of the Agriculture Committee. The main sticking point was over whether the EPA or the 
Department of Agriculture would administer a carbon offset program intended for farmers. 
. Peterson got his way: The (more sympathetic) Department of Agriculture will do the 
work.”)   
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hole through the nationwide cap on carbon dioxide emissions.”80  When 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s reorganization committee propose to 
consolidate all federal loan programs under the Treasury Department, FDR 
vetoed the suggestion, observing “that won’t work.  If they put them in the 
Treasury, not one of them will ever make a loan to anybody for any 
purpose.  There are too many glass-eyed bankers in the Treasury.”81  More 
recently, privacy advocates have expressed skepticism about the Obama 
Administration’s Internet privacy proposals because the Commerce 
Department is taking the lead, instead of a more pro-consumer agency, like 
the FTC.82 
As these examples illustrate, decisions about where to place certain 
responsibilities are simultaneously decisions about who will resolve certain 
disputes, and, in turn, what the outcome is likely to be.      
Once regulatory authority has been allocated in the first instance, 
Congressional committees are extremely reluctant to cede authority.  Like 
elsewhere, there are gains from expertise; individual members gain 
knowledge and experience with an agency’s operations over a period of 
years, and proposals to transfer regulatory authority to an agency that is 
overseen by a different committee places that investment of intellectual 
capital at risk.  In like fashion, a committee that is comfortable with the way 
a particular agency handles matters may be reluctant to allow others to take 
ownership of “their baby,” fearing their successors may not share their 
priorities.  Finally, individual members of Congress derive important 
electoral advantages from the committees on which they service, including 
                                                
80 Steven Mufson, Vote Set on House Climate Bill, Wash. Post, June 24, 2009, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/06/23/AR2009062303456.html  
81 A.J. WANN, THE PRESIDENT AT CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR – A STUDY OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 103-04 ( PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRESS 1968), See also Harold Seidman, Politics, 
Position and Power 88 (Oxford U. Press, 1970).  For a similar observation about the 
Federal Housing Authority, see DENNIS D. RILEY & BRYAN E. BROPHY-BAERMANN, 
BUREAUCRACY AND THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 71 (2006) (noting that FHA was 
initially staffed by “real estate people and mortgage brokers,” and the “values and 
prejudices” of those individuals resulted in a definition of agency success tied to “the 
number of loans made and the repayment record” – leading it to spend most of its resources 
on loan guarantees for newly constructed single family owner occupied homes – which 
resulted in the suburbs.   
82 See Edward Wyatt, White House, Consumers in Mind, Offers Online Privacy 
Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at B1 (“‘The real question is how much influence 
companies like Google, Microsoft, Yahoo and Facebook will have in their inevitable 
attempt to water down the rules that are implemented and render them essentially 
meaningless,’ John M. Simpson, privacy project director for Consumer Watchdog, said in 
response to the administration’s plan. ‘A concern is that the administration’s privacy effort 
is being run out of the Commerce Department.’”) 
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access to campaign contributions from those who are affected by the 
activities of government agencies subject to the oversight of the 
committees.  Oversight of a specific government agency creates a revenue 
stream that flows from the affected industry to the committee’s members.  
Reorganization measures that alter an agency’s powers can reduce or 
eliminate the revenue stream to a given committee.  This dynamic makes it 
clear why Congress takes a keen interest in reorganization.83 
Agency personnel are acutely conscious of these considerations, and 
they will dismiss out of hand organizational changes that create political 
difficulties.  For example, NOAA resulted from a blue-ribbon commission 
set up by the Johnson Administration, which recommended the creation of 
an independent agency focused on the ocean and atmosphere, including 
bureaus drawn from various civilian departments plus the Coast Guard 
(which was then part of DOT).84  After NOAA was created and placed in 
the Department of Commerce, a senior Commerce administrator contacted 
the Secretary of Transportation to discuss the possibility of transferring the 
Coast Guard, in keeping with the recommendations of the blue-ribbon 
commission.  The Secretary of Transportation responded that he was 
supportive of the move, but in exchange he wanted the Maritime 
Administration to be transferred from Commerce to DOT.  The senior 
administrator immediately responded “no deal,” because he recognized that 
the swap would rob the Department of Commerce of the political support of 
the maritime industry, and would alienate a key congressman.85   
The same considerations also help explain why the reorganization 
that yielded the Department of Homeland Security was so politically 
difficult.  No committee was inclined to surrender oversight authority unless 
it got something of at least equal value in return.  Even after the politics 
made reorganization inevitable, individual Congressional committees 
insisted on retaining regulatory oversight of “their” part of DHS.86   
                                                
83 See generally DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
CLAIM JURISDICTION 2 (1997) (“For individual legislators, the payoffs for winning in turf 
wars include expanded power, greater prestige, opportunities to make a personal mark on 




85 Steven Eli Schanes, Creating NOAA – The Coast Guard, at 
http://schanes.wordpress.com/2008/05/24/creating-noaa-the-coast-guard/  
86 See Karen Tumulty & Ed O’Keefe, The Government tends to resist reorganization, 
Washington Post, Jan 28, 2011, at A1. (“After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, nearly two dozen 
agencies were melded into the new Department of Homeland Security, to better coordinate 
the government's resources for handling terrorism and other national emergencies.  But the 
members of Congress overseeing those agencies were loath to give up any authority. That 
is why DHS gets marching orders from more than 100 congressional committees and 
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These dynamics tend to freeze in place existing allocations of 
policymaking power and to disable reform proposals that would move 
authority away from some government agencies and give it to others.  In his 
State of the Union addresses in 2010 and 2011, President Barack Obama 
proposed to reorganize and simplify various elements of the federal 
government.  This proposal seems certain to run afoul of the constraints 
discussed here, even in the most harmonious political environment.   
In light of the political phenomena described here, it is tempting to 
simply acquiesce in the inevitability of the existing distribution of agency 
responsibility.  But, major exogenous shocks (such as budget crises) can 
make substantial reorganizations politically possible (if not inevitable) – at 
which point the other six factors become more important in determining the 
allocation of responsibilities among the various bureaus, commissions, 
agencies, and departments that make up the United States government.   
Finally, the simple fact there is an ongoing demand for 
reorganization, even in the absence of major exogenous shocks, means that 
these issues are constantly in play.  No one ever permanently surrenders, 
and there is no final judgment rule enforced on the disputants.87  
 
B.  Which Criteria Matter Most? 
  
What mattes most in our list of seven criteria?  The problem is 
straightforward: as Judge Frank Easterbrook has noted, “Lists without 
metes, bounds, weights, or means of resolving conflicts do not identify 
necessary or sufficient conditions; they never prescribe concrete results.”88  
We believe that three factors matter most in predicting the long-term 
success of any given agency design: political implications, coherence, and 
capacity/capability.   
In our view, the most important factor is political support, or the 
lack thereof.  An agency is doomed if it lacks a supportive constituency, or 
                                                                                                                       
subcommittees - a number that has grown in the past seven years, despite the 9/11 
Commission's recommendation that those tangled lines of authority be consolidated.”)  
87 Cf. Wilson, supra note 7, at 299-300 (“Public policy making in Europe is like a 
prize-fight: two contenders, having earned the right to enter the ring, square off against 
each other for a prescribed number of rounds; when one fighter knocks the other one out, 
he is declared the winner and the fight is over.  Policy-making in the United States is more 
like a barroom brawl: Anyone can join in, the combatants fight all comers and sometimes 
change sides, no referee is in charge, and the fights last not for a fixed number of rounds 
but indefinitely or until everybody drops from exhaustion.  To repeat former Secretary of 
State George Shultz’s remark, ‘its never over.’”)  
88 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commissioner, 972 F.2d 858, 863-64 (7th Cir. 1992).   
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if the performance of its duties generates crippling political opposition.89  
More broadly, an agency will not be able to operate effectively if its 
structure raises serious doubts about its legitimacy or increases the 
vulnerability to political pressure that the performance of its duties will 
arouse.  
The second most important factor is policy coherence.  Greater 
coherence increases the likelihood the agency will define its aims more 
clearly, set priorities and design programs appropriately, and develop a 
well-recognized brand.  Coherence makes it easier to recruit qualified staff 
and build the necessary capacity to implement whatever programs are 
prioritized.  An agency with policy coherence is accordingly better able to 
establish its credibility with external audiences, including the legislators 
who will determine funding and otherwise oversee agency operations. 
 The third most important factor is the agency’s capacity/capability 
to perform its assigned functions.  A severe mismatch between the 
commitments in an agency’s policy portfolio and its capacity and capability 
to deliver results is likely to result in highly visible failures, of which 
Congress is usually quite unforgiving.  Agencies with an inadequate talent 
pool and frail resources are more likely to generate poorly conceived 
programs, and less likely to execute tasks effectively.  The mismatch 
between commitments and capacities creates a grim set of options.  An 
agency can engage in policy triage, in the hope there will be no disasters in 
the ignored policy space and that no one cares enough about the tasks that 
are being ignored to make a fuss.  Alternatively, an agency can try to cover 
all the assigned responsibilities with the predictable consequence of doing 
few (if any) of them well.  
 Of course, these factors are not fully independent: an agency is more 
likely to have the necessary resources (i.e., capability) if it has strong 
political supporters.  An agency that slights or over-emphasizes a portion of 
its regulatory portfolio is skating on thin ice unless its political supporters 
are on board with that decision.  (If those political supporters are voted out 
of office, the agency needs to quickly adapt, or there will be significant 
blow-back to subsequent initiatives, as the FTC learned to its dismay in the 
late 1970s.)  Similarly, without policy coherence, an agency is less likely to 
attract and maintain political support in the first instance.  Finally, there are 
further levels of complexity imbedded within some of the factors.90 
                                                
89 See, e.g., Norton Long, Power and Administration, 2 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REV. 257 
(1949) (“There is no more forlorn spectacle in the administrative world than an agency and 
a program possessed of statutory life, armed with executive orders sustained in the courts, 
yet stricken with paralysis and deprived of power, an object of contempt to its enemies and 
of despair to its friends.  The lifeblood of administration is power.”) 
90 For example, we have identified capacity as a factor.  Capacity is obviously affected 
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 Our typology raises other difficult questions.  Are all of the factors 
scalable?  Are any of them?  Can one compensate for weakness on one 
factor with strength on another?  Does one need a minimum quantum of all 
of the factors to get off the launching pad?  And so on.  These issues must 
await better data and require further research.  
 
IV. Application of Our Analysis to the FTC  
  
 We use the FTC as a case study because the Commission’s 
experience provides an especially rich context in which to apply the criteria 
we have described above.  Established in 1914, the FTC is the oldest and 
most closely studied independent regulatory commission in the federal 
government.91  The FTC has inspired an immense body of scholarship and 
figured prominently in blue ribbon reports that examine the organization of 
government.  No public regulatory body (much less an agency with roughly 
1300 employees and a budget of under $300 million today) has elicited 
comparable scrutiny. 
 
A.  The FTC as a Multi-Purpose Agency  
  
In the FTC’s near-century of experience provides superb material to 
assess the wisdom of combining variations functions in a single government 
agency.  Two closely-related characteristics of the FTC’s history make it an 
ideal test bed for our inquiry.  The first is the breadth of the agency’s 
charter.  The FTC is a diversified policy conglomerate.  It enforces the 
federal antitrust laws, performs economic research, publishes studies, and 
holds a broad consumer mandate that reaches advertising, non-bank 
financial services, marketing practices, product labeling, and privacy.  
Among other tasks, it is the agency that reviews mergers in the petroleum 
industry, enforces the Do-Not-Call telemarketing rule, defines energy 
labeling requirements for television sets, polices debt collection practices, 
reports on how media and entertainment companies disclose content 
unsuited for children, and prosecutes failures by companies to safeguard 
confidential data about their customers.  
                                                                                                                       
by the allocated budget, but does it make a difference if the agency is funded with user fees 
v. dedicated taxes v. general appropriations?  To what extent does the mix of funding 
among these choices reflect the impact of other factors – most importantly, political 
support?   
91 The Interstate Commerce Commission, established in 1887, was the first 
independent federal regulatory agency.  Its sole surviving component today is the Surface 
Transportation Board, whose chief function is to regulate tariffs and other terms of surface 
by railroads. 
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The second notable aspect of the Commission’s history is the 
malleability of its policy making portfolio.   In 1914 Congress intended the 
Commission to focus on competition policy – to advance the development 
of antitrust legal norms through administrative adjudication, consultation 
with the federal courts and the Department of Justice, and through the 
publication of studies for Congress and other public bodies  The boundaries 
of the original remit have shifted dramatically over time.  In some instances, 
the FTC absorbed new functions by accident.92  The Commission became 
the nation’s advertising and marketing practices regulator as an unintended 
consequence of its work to address complaints by firms that their rivals had 
gained an undue competitive advantage through dishonest sales tactics.  In 
other instances the FTC obtained new duties because Congress deliberately 
added new functions by measures such as credit practices legislation 
enacted in the 1960s.   
Additions of authority have been pronounced in periods, such as the 
early- to mid-1970s, when Congress enacted numerous extensions of the 
FTC’s duties. The Commission’s history features divestitures as well as 
acquisitions.  In some cases, the Commission in effected incubated 
regulatory functions that Congress later chose to spin-off and assign to new, 
stand-alone regulatory institutions.93 For example, this process led to the 
establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the 1930s.  
These adjustments appear to have reflected a legislative judgment that the 
regulatory functions in question were so substantial that they warranted 
implementation by agencies dedicated to those activities alone.  On other 
occasions Congress has divested or restricted FTC functions out of anger.  
Political backlash to FTC initiatives led Congress to enact curbs in the 
1920s on the agency’s authority involving agriculture and to adopt 
restrictions in 1980 upon the Commission’s work concerning insurance and 
advertising directed toward children.94 
 
B.  The Evaluative Criteria Applied to the FTC      
   
We organize our discussion around the seven factors identified in 
Part III.  We consider to which the FTC’s combination of functions is 
consistent with each criterion, and we use examples from FTC experience 
to illustrate our assessment. 
                                                
92 See supra footnote 18 and accompanying text. 
93 This history is recounted in Marc Winerman, The FTC at Ninety: History Through 
Headlines, 72 Antitrust L.J. 871, 880 n.44 (2005). 
94 On the limitations imposed in the 1920s and in 1980, see William E. Kovacic, The 
Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 
Tulsa L.J. 587, 623-25, 664-67 (1982). 
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  1.  Policy Coherence: Are the Functions Related and Consistent? 
 
In principle, the combination of competition and consumer 
protection functions within the FTC is a coherent policy design.  The two 
areas exhibit strong conceptual policy complementarities, and the agency’s 
implementation of its competition and consumer protection powers achieves 
substantial policy consistency: in performing its responsibilities in both 
policy domains, the agency generally seeks to improve consumer well-
being.  As we discuss below, the interaction of the two policy areas can 
create tension, as each discipline can display a different view about how 
best to advance consumer interests. The attainment of the best policy 
outcome sometimes will require balancing between competing perspectives.   
 a.  Relatedness: Significant Policy Complementarities 
 
Competition policy and consumer protection policy have important 
complementarities. They share significant intellectual foundations in the 
economics of information and consumer behavior.95  In general terms, 
antitrust seeks to improve performance on the supply side – to sustain the 
competitive pressures that drive firms to offer best possible array of goods 
and services. Antitrust agencies pursue this end by prosecuting private 
anticompetitive behavior (such as supplier cartels) and opposing public 
policies that restrict entry or expansion for the sake of protecting the 
interests of incumbent firms.  Consumer protection seeks to improve the 
choice process on the demand-side.  This principally involves programs to 
challenge deception and fraud, a consumer protection program helps ensure 
that sellers provide truthful information, which enables consumers to 
purchase goods or services that best satisfy their preferences.  Transactions 
induced by deception and outright fraud do not satisfy the necessary 
conditions for making consumer sovereignty the force that determines what 
the economy will produce.  A consumer protection also can enhance the 
quality of consumer decision making by ensuring that product and service 
disclosures, such as information required by legal mandates, are 
comprehensible to consumers.96  
The complementarities between competition policy and consumer 
                                                
95 See Timothy J. Muris, The Interface of Competition and Consumer Protection (Oct. 
31, 2002) (Fordham Corp. Law Institute, 29th Annual Conference on International Antitrust 
Law and Policy), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/021031fordham.pdf. 
96 James M. Lacko & Janis K. Pappalardo, Improving Consumer Mortgage 
Disclosures: An Empirical Assessment of Current and Prototype Disclosure Forms (Federal 
Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, June 2007), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/P025505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf. 
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protection policy, as well as possibilities for substitution between them, 
here provide at least a theoretical basis for supposing that a competition 
agency with consumer protection responsibilities will realize synergies 
between the two fields and improve the quality of public policy.  A unity of 
functions might put an agency in a better position to identify the source of 
market failures more accurately and proscribe superior cures that involve an 
optimal mix of regulatory strategies.97  Many of the world’s 120 
competition agencies perform consumer protection functions, such as 
policing deceptive advertising.98  We make no claim that the existing dual-
function agencies ordinarily attain the theoretical synergies in practice, or 
that the combination of functions affords them superior insight into the 
causes of economic problems.  In principle, the presence of strong policy 
complimentarities indicates that the integration of these functions within a 
single agency has potential to improve policy making.   
The presence of strong policy complementarities suggests a general 
principle that would apply in jurisdictions that do not choose to bundle 
complementary functions into the same agency. If policy complementarities 
are strong and policy responsibilities are assigned to single-function 
agencies, there should be close cooperation between the single-function 
agencies.  In other words, if integration by ownership does not occur, close 
integration by inter-agency contract is desirable.  Close cooperation by a 
single-function antitrust agency and a single-function consumer protection 
agency likely will yield better policy results than having the two institutions 
operate without regard to the other’s activities. 
 
 b.  Consistency: Common Consumer Orientation      
 
As the discussion above suggests, competition and consumer 
protection share a common objective or promoting consumer well-being.  
This common objective imparts a substantial degree of consistency to 
policies adopted in the two domains.  We can contrast this condition with 
other policies that might be considered to be related but not consistent.  
Antitrust law and trade restrictions can be considered to be complimentary 
to the extent that both regimes seek to prevent market distortions that arise 
when firms make certain sales below cost.  The goals of the two regimes, 
however, are dissimilar.  In antitrust law, the purpose of restrictions on 
predatory pricing is to preclude behavior that results in the exclusion of 
firms whose continued presence in the market would have driven suppliers 
                                                
97 See Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer 
Protection Issues, 62 Boston University L.Rev. 661 (1982) (analyzing tying as a consumer 
protection problem). 
98 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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to engage in activities (such as cost reduction and innovation) that serve 
consumer interests.  An important aim of the anti-dumping regime, reflected 
in its operational standards, is the protection of domestic firms and the 
preservation of jobs they provide, even at the expense of purchasers of the 
products such firms manufacture.   
Notwithstanding their complementarities, it also is possible to view 
competition policy and consumer protection policy as substitutes.  As this 
simple example illustrates, competition can serve as a valuable form of 
consumer protection.  We can imagine a hypothetical market in which the 
government can choose one of two approaches to encourage performance 
that best satisfies consumer preferences.  One approach is to have a single 
firm serve the entire market, with the monopolist supplier being subject to 
comprehensive oversight with respect to pricing and quality.  Even with 
extensive regulatory oversight, the monopolist may have relatively weak 
incentives to identify and satisfy consumer tastes, especially by introducing 
new products and services.  A second approach is to encourage rivalry 
among suppliers to provide the best range of alternatives.  The latter 
approach also involves greater reliance on market forces to counteract fraud 
and other forms of overreaching by suppliers.  The pro-competition policy 
contemplated here includes efforts to preclude supplier collusion that would 
restrict the flow of truthful product information to consumers or would 
impede the work of expert intermediaries to give consumers advice about 
how to select among product options.    
In a number of instances, the solution set for policy making will 
include a range of alternatives that include more or less relative emphasis 
on these two models.  In most instances, the lawyers who practice in the 
fields of antitrust or consumer protection will be inclined to favor one 
model or the other, depending upon their training and experience. 
Specialists in one field rarely have extensive familiarity with the other.  
This form of specialization gives the two practice areas distinctive cultures, 
each with different preferences for the form of government intervention. 
Most antitrust lawyers are likely to have relatively greater confidence in the 
capacity of competition and related market-oriented processes to provide a 
desired level of consumer protection.  By contrast, the consumer protection 
lawyer may less trusting of market processes and more inclined to perceive 
consumers as vulnerable and prone to supplier manipulation.  This 
orientation will incline a consumer protection attorney to favor policies that 
more directly control business practices – for example, by setting greater 
limits upon the content of advertising.  This orientation can be reinforced by 
an attorney’s extensive experience in dealing with serious fraud.  A heavy 
dose of cases involving products that are claimed to cure cancer, yield 
immense wealth, or secure lasting beauty can engender an underlying 
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suspicion of the market system.  Like an experienced homicide detective 
who fears that all of humankind is dangerously prone to violent crime, an 
experienced consumer protection attorney may come to think that most 
advertising is a form of falsehood.   
These differences in culture and perspective between the two 
disciplines can be important for the operation of the regulatory process even 
within an agency that has both competition and consumer protection duties.  
The integration of perspectives to achieve the best policy result (for 
example, by designing an anti-fraud program that properly accounts for the 
role of advertising in promoting competition that serves consumer interests) 
will not occur automatically.  Within the FTC, the Bureau of Economics is a 
major source of agency’s policy integration.  BE functions as an 
independent unit, and it supports the agency’s competition and consumer 
protection groups. Among other contributions, BE has helped the agency 
account for the economics literature concerning the collection, analysis, and 
transmission of information and has highlighted its implications for the 
behavior of individual firms and groups of firms.  This has improved the 
agency’s understanding of how consumers make choices among the array of 
products and services available to them.99 The FTC’s experience shows that 
a dual function agency will need to take conscious steps to achieve effective 
integration and resolve tensions that can arise concerning the correct mix of 
regulatory measures.       
  
 c. Examples from FTC Experience 
 
The FTC’s experience with the health care, health-related 
advertising issues, and data protection provides illuminates the synergies 
and tensions that can arise between competition and consumer protection.   
In the 1970s, the Commission introduced pioneering programs to liberalize 
the provision of health care services and products.100  Before the 1970s, 
regulatory policy at the federal and state levels tended to establish severe 
restrictions on advertising by physicians and strong limits on the ability of 
consumers to seek alternative suppliers for health care products such as 
eyeglasses.   
To address these restrictions, the FTC used a mix of litigation, 
                                                
99 The literature on information economics provides the principal basis for the category 
of research now known as behavioral economics.  See The Law and Economics of 
Irrational Behavior (Francesco Parisi & Vernon Smith eds., 2005, Stanford University 
Press). 
100 See William E. Kovacic, Measuring What Matters: The Federal Trade Commission 
and Investments in Competition Policy Research and Development, 72 Antitrust L.J. 861 
(2005) (discussing development of FTC health care program). 
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rulemaking, research, public consultations, and advocacy.  The Commission 
initiated a series of cases that struck down absolute restrictions on physician 
advertising and precluded medical societies from forbidding the revelation 
of truthful information.  The agency also adopted a trade regulation rule 
(Eyeglasses I) that, among other measures, required optometrists to give a 
copy of eyewear prescriptions to their patients.  The rule originated within 
the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, and the agency’s Bureau of 
Economics and Bureau of Competition played major roles in its design.  
Eyeglasses I fostered a dramatic increase in competition among eyewear 
manufacturers and retailers.  Over the past decade, the FTC has used 
experience with the eyeglasses rule to implement legislation mandating 
steps to liberalize the sale of contact lenses.  The agency also has filed an 
extensive series of comments with state legislatures to address existing or 
proposed adjustments to controls on the sale of health care services and 
products.  To identify commercial trends and promote debate about its 
programs, the Commission also has held public consultations and published 
reports.    
These elements of the FTC’s health care program have built upon a 
generally effective collaboration among the agency’s different disciplines.  
A major source of policy integration has been the Bureau of Economics, 
whose research and analysis have played a crucial role in assessing the 
asserted quality control justifications for the regulatory status quo.  A 
second important force for integration has been the agency-wide Office of 
Policy Planning and the Policy Studies group of the Office of the General 
Counsel.  Relatively few internal tensions have arisen in the formulation of 
this program, perhaps because the Commission ordinarily has been in the 
position of attacking fairly categorical competitive restraints that bear no 
plausible relationship to the quality control rationales that are said to justify 
limitations on advertising or marketing.  Some of the agency’s more recent 
initiatives, such as the contact lens matters, have involved practices with 
more subtle and complex quality control concerns.  The Commission has 
analyzed these issues with care, a reflection of the Commission’s awareness 
that a failure to account for legitimate quality control considerations could 
cause serious consumer injury and endanger the agency’s entire program in 
this field.    
An initiative with more mixed results and greater internal tension is 
the FTC’s treatment of health-related advertising claims.  For many years, 
public policy developed by the FTC and federal health agencies such as the 
Food and Drug Administration displayed an acute suspicion of food 
advertisements that attributed beneficial health effects to the consumption 
of a product.  Federal policy tended to frown upon producer efforts to link 
product attributes to a reduction in the risk of disease.  Research by the 
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FTC’s Bureau of Economics in the 1980s and 1990s called this approach 
into question.  The FTC’s economists raised the possibility that a more 
liberal approach would provide consumers with valuable nutritional 
information and promote product innovations (such as the introduction of 
higher fiber content into breakfast cereals) with generally positive health 
effects.  The FTC has relied upon this line of research to loosen its own 
controls upon health claims and to advocate similar adjustments by the 
FDA.101   
These initiatives have inspired considerable tension within the FTC 
and the larger policy making community.  A task force consisting of the 
FTC, the FDA, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of 
Health and Human Services recently released proposed guidelines for food 
advertising directed toward children.  The guidelines are cast as voluntary 
measures, although the agencies suggest that the industry’s failure to 
embrace them or to take similar steps could result in additional government 
intervention.  For the most part, the proposed guidelines reflect the 
longstanding tradition of suspicion that anchored public policy before the 
Bureau of Economics research of the 1980s and 1990s.  A similar effort to 
toughen limits on nutritional advertising is evident in settlements that 
resolve recent FTC advertising cases.  The Commission’s settlements 
require producers to use more elaborate scientific testing to substantiate 
health-related claims.  These measures reflect, at least implicitly, a doubtful 
view of the market-oriented prescriptions that came out of the Bureau of 
Economics studies of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Issues related to data protection and information privacy provide 
another context in which debates have arisen about what mix of competition 
and consumer protection initiatives will best serve consumer interests.  In 
December 2010 and March 2012, the FTC released reports with proposals 
that firms to strengthen data security safeguards and increase the ability of 
consumers to control the collection and use about their purchasing and 
searches on the internet.102  The reports recommended consideration of a 
‘Do-Not-Track mechanism that would enable a consumer to instruct firms 
not to maintain records of the consumer’s online activity.  The FTC’s 
reports revealed little evident input from the Commission’s competition or 
economics operating bureaus. 
     
  2.  Credibility: Does the Combination Create A Recognizable and 
 Respected Brand? 
 
                                                
101 See Pauline M. Ippolito, What Can We Learn from Food Advertising Policy Over 
the Last 25 years?, 12 George Mason L. Rev. 939 (2004). 
102 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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The FTC has strived to establish general recognition that it is the 
principal federal agency for safeguarding consumer interests.  This is 
common element of branding by agencies with a dual competition and 
consumer protection mandate.  The United Kingdom’s Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT), which has largely the same remit as the FTC, states its 
purpose as “making markets work well for consumers.”103  This short and 
statement of purpose is one of many ways that similarly situated agencies 
identify themselves with the promotion of consumer well-being.  
In this aim, the Commission appears to have been generally 
successful.  Its public reputation and its stature within Congress largely 
derive from its consumer protection work, especially highly visible 
initiatives such as the Do Not Call program.104  There is only modest 
awareness of the Commission’s role as a competition policy institution, and 
perhaps still weaker understanding of how the agency’s combination of 
functions informs its choice and execution of programs.  Thus, the agency is 
largely associated with consumer protection issues.  The breadth of the 
agency’s mandate can create unwanted expectations that the agency is the 
appropriate solution for all difficult economic problems that affect 
consumers.   
 
a. Branding a Policy Conglomerate 
 
As a policy conglomerate, the FTC faces the same difficulties that 
confront many diversified enterprises: How does the entity create a brand 
that internal observers (agency managers and staff) and external 
constituencies (e.g., legislators, businesses, and consumers) recognize and 
respect?  The FTC’s purpose is not evident from its name.  In the modern 
world, a “federal trade commission” evokes associations with agencies that 
scrutinize imports and penalize foreign firms that sell goods below cost in 
the United States.  When FTC employees return from overseas travel and 
present their official passports to U.S. immigration officers, they are to be 
asked if they made progress in trade negotiations with foreign governments.  
Over the years, the FTC has used various phrases to identify its purpose.  In 
general, most of the agency’s branding activities have sought to identify the 
Commission with the promotion of consumer interests.105  Most of this 
                                                
103 This phrase appears on the OFT’s website and on the agency’s promotional 
materials.  The OFT website is www.oft.gov.uk. 
104 On the Do Not Call Rule and its political implications for the FTC, see Sidney M. 
Milkis, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Protection: Regulatory Change and 
Administrative Pragmatism, 72 Antitrust L.J. 911 (2005). 
105 The Commission underscores its connection to consumers in various documents, 
and promotional materials.  See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, The FTC in 2008: A 
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branding effort takes place in official reports and speeches by top agency 
leadership, particularly the FTC Chair. 
Within the FTC, administrative and professional staff members 
appear to share a general sense of purpose.  If asked to respond to a survey, 
most would say that the agency seeks to protect consumer well-being.  At 
the same time, we doubt that many could explain how the two principle 
mandates of the agency combine to fulfill that purpose.  In 2008, the FTC 
performed a self-study and conducted internal and external interviews to 
identify paths for improvement.106  Agency staff members ordinarily define 
the agency’s brand and purpose in terms of the projects of their own 
operating units.   It is relatively unusual to find personnel in the Bureau of 
Competition or Bureau of Consumer Protection who could identify five 
major pending initiatives of the other Bureau. 
This raises a basic question about agency organization: is a dual 
purpose competition and consumer protection agency more likely to 
reinforce awareness of its dual, complementary nature among its own 
personnel and increase external understanding of its character if it takes 
formal steps to integrate these functions internally.  We know of a single 
agency – the OFT – that has undertaken internal organizational reforms to 
create integrated operating units (both policy offices and teams of case 
handlers) that combine the disciplines of competition and consumer 
protection.  The OFT adopted these reforms within the past decade, and it is 
difficult to tell how this has affected internal and external perceptions of the 
agency’s brand and purpose.  It is clear that efforts by OFT leadership to 
emphasize the conceptual and organizational fusion of the two disciplines 
have made internal and external constituencies increasingly aware of the 
combination of functions.   
In testimony and speeches, FTC leaders have emphasized the 
conceptual links between competition and consumer protection, but the 
Commission has not undertaken the ambitious internal restructuring carried 
out by the OFT.  The FTC has relied on much looser forms of integration to 
achieve a synthesis of competition and consumer protection policy 
internally and enhance its external branding efforts.  There is relatively little 
routine collaboration between the Bureau of Competition and Bureau of 
Consumer Protection.  The agency relies mainly on the agency’s 
commissioners, the Bureau of Economics, the Office of Policy Planning, 
and the General Counsel’s office of policy studies to see that both 
perspectives inform the treatment of problems facing the agency. An 
attempt to create dual purpose operating groups from the existing Bureaus 
                                                                                                                       
Force for Consumers and Competition (Mar. 2008) (annual report).   
106 William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission at 100: Into Our 2nd Century 
(Jan. 2009), at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc.workshops/ftc100/docs/ftc100rpt. 
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of Competition and Consumer Protection will be prohibitively expensive in 
the eyes of most FTC chairs.  Internal resistance will be ferocious and 
durable – good reasons for a chair to use precious time (a tenure of three or 
four years) and energy on other matters.  Yet there are milder alternatives 
worth exploring.  These include greater reliance on inter-bureau task forces 
and a routine program of secondments that assign personnel from one unit 
to work in another.  
The desire to create broad awareness of an agency as a pro-
consumer agency can affect, and distort, the agency’s allocation of 
resources.  As noted above, consumer protection initiatives generally have 
the greatest impact on consumer perceptions.  The Do Not Call registry, 
cases that return monetary redress to victims of fraud, and educational 
materials on ID theft are but some of the many FTC initiatives that provide 
services which consumers readily understand.  Antitrust matters 
(particularly matters involving widely known providers of consumer goods 
and services) sometimes create broad public awareness.  Nonetheless, the 
typical antitrust case (such as a challenge to a merger involving suppliers of 
inputs to the production of industrial goods) has less ability than the typical 
consumer protection case to raise public awareness of the agency.  To this 
one can add the generally accurate proposition that what might be called 
routine consumer protection cases (e.g., a case against fraud) are less 
expensive to prepare than routine antitrust cases.       
A dual purpose agency that sees a greater return to its reputation 
(and stronger approval by its legislature) may choose to invest more 
resources in consumer protection, even though the investment of the same 
resources in an antitrust case would contribute more to economic 
performance.  The FTC now spends about 55 percent of its resources on 
consumer protection, and the balance on competition.  As a rough matter, 
the greatest legislative pressures in recent years have demanded more 
attention to consumer protection matters involving financial services and 
privacy.  Competition issues (notably, involving prices for petroleum 
products) receive significant congressional attention, as well, but the focus 
of concern has been on consumer protection matters.  This also creates 
strong incentives for a dual purpose agency to shift resources toward the 
consumer protection agenda.  Thus, for dual purpose agencies it is worth 
examining their distribution of resources over time to determine whether 
different responsibilities are receiving suitable emphasis. 
 
b. Branding and the Assignment of Regulatory Tasks 
  
The assignment and performance of regulatory tasks can either 
reinforce or undermine the creation of a strong and favorable consumer-
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oriented brand.  The FTC’s deepest impact on consumer perceptions has 
come through its consumer protection activities.  Like the FTC, most dual-
function agencies derive the highest levels of public recognition from 
interventions dealing with consumer goods and services.  Competition 
matters generally do not diminish recognition of the agency’s consumer 
orientation, but they rarely reinforce it.  Compared to consumer protection, 
competition policy activity tends to have a neutral impact on the FTC brand. 
The consumer protection portfolio is not always an unmixed 
blessing for branding purposes.  Under a large umbrella of consumer 
protection, a dual purpose agency is likely to find specific duties that blur or 
damage its image.  In a number of instances, the FTC has sought to off load 
responsibilities that undermined its brand.  One of these deals with 
cigarettes.  The FTC was the first federal agency to propose regulatory 
action on cigarettes after the issuance of the Surgeon General’s report on 
the hazards of smoking in 1964.107  The FTC proposed a trade regulation 
rule that would have required tobacco companies to place health warnings 
on cigarette packages.  Congress eventually adopted legislation mandating 
such labeling, but it assigned responsibility for testing tar and nicotine 
levels in cigarettes to the FTC – even though the agency had no particular 
expertise in testing, or in assessing the health risks of different levels of tar 
and nicotine.   
For roughly twenty years, the FTC dutifully ran a “smoking 
laboratory,” using machines that measured the tar and nicotine content of 
cigarettes smoked using a specified method.  In 1987, the FTC ceased 
conducting the tests after concluding that it had no comparative advantage 
in running a testing laboratory.  The FTC outsourced the work to an 
independent testing laboratory under the agency’s supervision.108 This 
mitigated but did not solve the FTC’s problems.  Health researchers 
identified that testing regime – which continued to be called “the FTC 
method” – did not account for how smokers adjusted their behavior.  
Smokers offset the lower tar and nicotine levels by smoking more cigarettes 
and inhaling more deeply.  Aware of the deficiencies of the testing regimen 
and the harm to the agency’s image from being associated with the tests, the 
FTC asked Congress to assign all responsibility for the testing program and 
                                                
107 Trade Regulation Rule for the Prevention of Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and 
Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed Reg. 8324 
(1964). The FTC’s cigarette rule was drafted by Richard Posner, then an attorney advisor at 
the FTC.   
108 The independent testing laboratory was the Tobacco Institute Testing Laboratory. 
On the history of the FTC’s involvement in testing cigarettes for tar, nicotine, and carbon 
monoxide, see Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Cigarette Tar and 
Nicotine Testing Before the House Commerce Subcommittee on Transportation, Tourism, 
and Hazardous Materials, United States House of Representatives (May 7, 1987).    
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the reporting of results to one of the federal departments responsible for 
health and science.109 
The FTC also has sought to wave off the addition of new functions 
that might blur its brand or so divert resources that the enhancement of 
well-recognized product lines suffers.  One contentious issue during the 
debates over the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act was the treatment of credit transactions carried out in connection with 
the purchase of a motor vehicle.  The automobile dealers fought vigorously, 
and successfully, to keep these transactions outside the supervision of the 
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  However, they did not escape 
new regulatory oversight completely.  Congress insisted that the new 
financial services framework place motor vehicle transactions under the 
oversight of some federal agency.  Scanning the landscape of possibilities, 
Congress gazed at the FTC.110  Fearing that it would receive a major new 
mandate without a commensurate increase in funds to carry it out, the 
Commission argued against receiving the new authority.  These pleas were 
unavailing, as was the request for more funds.  This experience highlighted 
a broader phenomenon that occurs as Congress assigns new duties to an 
agency with some experience in the general policy domain: it seldom 
provides appropriations to carry out the new commands.  The Commission 
has competence in credit practices matters going back to the 1960s.  
Adapting this expertise to address automobile sales is manageable in 
concept, but the resource demands of the new oversight role could be 
daunting.  With no additional funding, the only way to pay for the new 
program is to withdraw support internally from the fulfillment of other 
legislative commands 
.  
i. Portfolio Adjustments, Branding, and Planning  
 
The addition or subtraction of functions has important implications 
for the definition of the agency’s aims and its branding activities.  As 
functions expand or contract, the agency must focus on how the adjustments 
will influence perceptions inside and outside the agency about what it does.   
The need for greater attention to planning, priority setting, and brand 
positioning is perhaps greatest when an agency gains functions, or when 
possibilities for addition emerge.  Augmentations can greatly affect the 
allocation of resources and the mix of programs the agency pursues.  Will 
                                                
109 Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning Tobacco 
Advertising Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United 
States Senate (Nov. 13, 2007), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/PO64508tobacco.pdf. 
110 The FTC’s responsibilities for protecting consumers in the sale and leasing of 
automobiles are described at 78 Fed. Reg. 14014 (Mar. 15, 2011). 
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an expansion of existing activity to encompass an emerging area of concern 
dramatically alter the agency’s character?   
Over the past decade, privacy and data protection have ascended as 
FTC priorities.  As the FTC’s privacy program (now overseen in BCP’s 
Division of Privacy and Identify Protection) grows, several paths are 
possible.  One is a significant redirection of resources that inevitably has the 
effect of reorienting the mix of policy outputs and skewing the overall 
allocation of funds more heavily toward the consumer protection side of the 
FTC’s house.  If the FTC moved from a 55/45 split between consumer 
protection and competition to something like a 65/35 or 70/30 distribution, 
would the wisdom of retaining a competition competence within the FTC, 
rather than moving the function entirely to the Antitrust Division of the 
Justice Department, come into question?  Would the growth of the agency’s 
privacy role give rise to suggestions that Congress spin the unit off as a 
stand-alone data protection body – a move that would put the U.S. national 
data protection system on the same institutional footing used by most other 
jurisdictions?  To answer these and other questions, a multi-function agency 
must have a mechanism for considering how dramatic and more subtle 
changes in its authority affect its ability to define its brand clearly and 
coherently.   
 
  3. Capacity and Capability 
 
As described earlier, capacity refers to the pool of knowledge and 
resources that the agency can bring to bear, and capability refers to the 
range of policy levers and quality of the resulting decisions.   
Throughout its history, the FTC has struggled to see that the 
commitments entailed by its multifaceted mandate do not outrun its 
capacity to deliver good policy results.  Through most of its history, the 
Commission has suffered from a tendency to initiate ambitious programs 
without adequate attention to the basic prerequisites of effective 
implementation.  These flaws played a major part in placing the agency in 
peril in the late 1970s and early 1980s.111  The agency’s extraordinary 
combination of competition and consumer protection measures elicited 
harsh political backlash and enmeshed the Commission in destructive 
turmoil with Congress.  Although some FTC initiatives from this period 
(such as the Eyeglasses I rule and the beginnings of the antitrust health care 
program) succeeded splendidly, many litigation and rulemaking 
proceedings foundered in the courts.   
The FTC’s performance on this score has improved greatly over the 
                                                
111 See Kovacic, supra note 94, at 664-71. 
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past 30 years.  The agency has learned the hard way to ask basic questions 
about each new undertaking: How much will it cost?  Who will do it?  How 
long will it take? What do we expect to accomplish? What are the doctrinal, 
political, and management risks?  How will we know if it’s working?  The 
bruising experiences of the late 1970s and early 1980s inspired stronger 
attention to planning and program management.  The matching of the 
FTC’s commitments to capabilities remains a massive challenge for the 
institution      
 
a. Chronic Underfunding of Mandates 
 
Agencies seldom will receive the resources needed to fulfill all the 
regulatory commands assigned to them.  This is the case of the modern 
FTC.  In many instances, such as the automobile credit sales provision of 
Dodd Frank, Congress assigns major new responsibilities without providing 
resources to carry them out.  The legislative process that generates new 
substantive legislation is detached from the process that appropriates funds.  
Thus, Congress rarely considers the resource implications of requirements 
that the agency enforce new laws, issue new rules, or prepare reports.   
Agencies respond to these imperatives in one of two ways, both of 
which undermine agency effectiveness.  The first is to undertake programs 
that exceed the agency’s ability to execute them effectively.  The agency 
will be tempted to cut corners by weakening internal quality control 
measures, understaffing ambitious projects, or assigning difficult litigation 
or rulemaking tasks to relatively inexperienced personnel.  Even though 
senior personnel may recognize how much resource constraints limit agency 
capacity, they may still acquiesce in Congressional demands for the 
initiation of new projects.  A short term political appointee may regard the 
initiation of a new measure as a credit-claiming event and may see the risk 
that an improvidently conceived project may fail as a cost that will be borne 
by future agency leaders and will not be attributed fully, or at all, to the 
appointee who originated it.  Without an effective feedback mechanism that 
forces the incumbent appointee to internalize such costs, it is easy to begin 
such projects, even when they outrun the agency’s capacity. 
 A second mechanism is to fund new projects adequately by a 
relatively silent form of triage.  This consists of draining resources away 
from other programs ostensibly designed to implement congressionally 
imposed duties.  To support new programs in areas such as privacy, data 
protection, and mortgage lending fraud, the FTC over time has quietly 
abandoned other programs that used to be mainstays of enforcement.  To 
some extent this is done with at least the implicit approval of Congress.  
Through official budget requests and oversight hearings, Congress is at least 
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generally aware of how the Commission is spending its money.  It can 
detect that some areas of policy responsibility seem to be inactive.  
Congress can observe, for example, that the FTC has brought two 
Robinson-Patman Act price discrimination cases in the past 23 years.112  
This reliably indicates diminished attention to a statute whose enforcement 
in the 1960s yielded hundreds of cases.  For the most part, the FTC has 
constructed or retooled major programs involving privacy, financial 
services, mergers, horizontal restraints, and single firm conduct by severely 
reducing outlays for the enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act and 
consumer protection statutes dealing with fur and textile labeling.   
 Even if one accepts the notion that Congress has acquiesced in this 
repositioning, there is still a unsettling lack of accountability and 
transparency in this pattern.  Nominal legal commands remain in place, yet 
the agency walks away from them without the type of public deliberation 
and debate that arguably ought to proceed an important redirection of 
policy.  Quiet abandonment and repositioning allow Congress and the 
agency to maintain an outward commitment to statutes whose implementing 
programs are hollow due to a lack of resources.  A more honest approach 
would be to consider repeal of unenforced laws or to confront the 
commitments vs. resources issue more directly in discussions about new 
legislation.  The agency also knows that if, for some reason, a seemingly 
dormant and neglected policy area comes to life, legislators will chastise it 
for not sustaining an adequate presence in the area.  It is not honorable to 
make policy by crossing one’s fingers and hoping that certain contingencies 
do not come to pass.     
  
b. The Sirens of Expansive Authority 
 
The FTC’s history features a painful tendency to over-promise and 
under-deliver.  One important cause of the mismatch between promises and 
performance is the exaggerated sense of capacity that can come from the 
broad grants of authority that a multi-function agency often possesses.  As 
the agency’s powers expand, and Congress urges the agency to use new 
authority aggressively, the Commission’s leadership and professional staff 
sometimes have perceived that the agency has the ability and the obligation 
to solve all economic problems that come to its attention.  In the 1970s, 
Congress dramatically enhanced the scope and power of the FTC’s 
powers.113  In addition, Supreme Court decisions early in the decade 
                                                
112 William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy 
Enforcement Norm, 71 Antitrust L.J. 377, 410-15 (discussing patterns of federal 
government enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act). 
113 Kovacic, supra note 94, at 631-42 (discussing congressional expansion of FTC 
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interpreted the Commission’s existing powers broadly. Some FTC officials 
have found the possibilities inherent in these developments to be enervating 
and willingly grasped new opportunities to exercise them.  Others were 
more cautious, but they felt a duty to use the agency’s elastic mandates to 
address various forms of business behavior, even though the behavior takes 
place at or beyond the boundary of the agency’s statutes.   
In either case, the zone of what the agency and its leadership 
perceive to be appropriate forms of and occasions for intervention will tend 
to expand as Congress adds regulatory tools to its portfolio.  This is 
especially true if the agency’s mandates tend to be far-reaching and 
relatively open-ended.  This arguably is the case of the FTC, whose 
foundational statute permits the agency to condemn “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices” and to proscribe “unfair methods of competition.”  Over 
time, agency staff has tended to read these statutes in increasingly 
expansive ways. For example, in the 1970s, the FTC undertook an 
exceptionally ambitious program of competition and consumer protection 
matters.  Some initiatives produced successful outcomes, but many 
ambitious endeavors failed in ways that caused long-lived harm to the 
Commission’s reputation and endangered various areas of the FTC’s 
mandate.114   
The presence of seemingly expansive authority also makes the 
Commission an attractive congressional choice to solve any urgent 
economic problem that may emerge.  If gasoline prices increase sharply in 
the wake of a natural disaster, Congress is likely to turn to the FTC, whose 
charter enables it to attack “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices,”115 and demand that the agency use these broad 
grants of authority to do something about the problem.  Any jarring 
dislocation in the economy – a price surge in a one sector, or a supply 
shortage in another – becomes fair game for legislators to demand that the 
FTC bring its seeming open-ended powers to bear upon the problem.116  In 
December 2007, Congress enacted legislation to prohibit the manipulation 
of petroleum markets and gave the FTC authority to promulgate rules to 
enforce the measure.117  In 2009 the FTC adopted an implementing 
regulation that Congress will call for the agency to enforce vigorously 
                                                                                                                       
powers from 1970 to 1976). 
114 This history is recounted in William E. Kovacic, Congress and the Federal Trade 
Commission, 57 Antitrust Law Journal 517 (1989). 
115 15 U.S.C. Section 45. 
116 These measures are described in William E. Kovacic, Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States and Its Influence on the Conception of Competition Policy, 11 Competition Law 
Journal 89 (2012). 
117 This authority was created in Title VIII of the Energy Independence and Security 
Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. §§ 17301-17305. 
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whenever gasoline prices rise significantly.118 This measure has little 
prospect of addressing the two factors that most account for the prices of 
petroleum products: the supply of crude oil and the consumption demand of 
American consumers and business. 
  
c. Recruiting and Retaining Human Capital 
 
Whether an agency performs one function or many, its performance 
depends on whether it has the human resources to accomplish its assigned 
tasks.  The decision to add a new area of policy responsibility requires an 
internal assessment of whether the institution has the right skills to perform 
the function.  The FTC’s expansion of efforts involving data security and 
privacy has led to an increase in personnel with forensic skills in computer 
technology, mobile telephony, and internet operations.  To support the work 
of these professionals, the agency also has made major investments in 
internal laboratories and other investigative resources to deal with online 
fraud.  Likewise, the FTC’s initiatives to work more actively at the 
intersection between antitrust law and patent law have led to the hiring of 
patent attorneys to serve in the Bureau of Competition. 
The failure to maintain a good fit between program demands and 
personnel capabilities has crippled FTC programs on a number of occasions 
in the past.  From 1970 through the middle of the decade, the Commission 
undertook an ambitious agenda of programs.119  On the competition side, 
the FTC initiated a broad program to challenge monopolization and shared 
monopolization in industries such as breakfast cereal, bread, petroleum, 
photocopying, and pharmaceuticals.  The FTC also began challenge, 
described above, to restrictions on advertising imposed by the American 
Medical Association.  The agency also attacked distribution practices in the 
soft drink sector and sought to forbid the parallel, non-collusive adoption of 
certain pricing and marketing practices by competitors.   
The agency’s consumer protection work during the 1970s was no 
less ambitious and perhaps more expansive.  The FTC initiated over fifteen 
rulemaking proceedings.  Some of these measures sought to modify 
doctrines with universal application in the economy, such as the holder in 
due course rule.  Others attempted to impose requirements governing the 
provision of specific types of goods or services, including funerals, used 
cars, vocational schools, eyeglasses, dietary supplements, hearing aids, and 
advertising directed toward children.   
 The FTC’s economic research program also pursued far-reaching 
                                                
118 Federal Trade Commission, Prohibitions on Market Manipulation: Final Rule, 74 
Fed. Reg. 40686 (Aug. 12, 2009), codified at 16 Code of Federal Regulations 317. 
119 Kovacic, supra note 94, at 643-51. 
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objectives in the 1970s. The agency established a line-of-business reporting 
program that compelled a large number of enterprises to provide detailed 
information about their sales and profits in specific product groups.  The 
Commission also undertook high profile studies involving specific sectors, 
including the business of insurance.  
This impressive list of projects pressed against the weakest joints of 
the Commission’s human capital infrastructure. The agency paid little 
attention to the fit between these ambitious measures, many of which 
involved novel legal theories and complex facts, and the FTC’s capacity to 
execute them skillfully.  FTC leadership blithely added new bet-your-
agency initiatives to Commission’s agenda without a careful examination of 
the human capital needed to handle difficult matters successfully.  Nor did 
the agency anticipate what kinds of talent the affected industries would 
muster in opposition. Many of the FTC’s antitrust cases and consumer 
protection rulemakings sought powerful remedies to transform the structure 
and behavior of the sectors in question. With massive commercial interests 
at stake, companies hired the best of the defense bar and the economic 
consultancies to represent them.  In too many instances, the FTC sent small 
and relatively inexperienced teams to face legions of highly capable 
opposing counsel.    
 
  4. Resilience: Is the Existing Assignment of Functions Adaptable  
 and Sustainable? 
 
The FTC’s mix of competition and consumer protection has proven 
to be adaptable and resilient.  As described earlier, the agency’s portfolio 
has changed substantially over time.  Sometimes through its own 
repositioning and sometimes with congressional approval, the agency has 
entered new policy terrain.  In the jargon of computer technology, the 
Commission’s powers have proven to be highly scalable.  At the same time, 
the Commission has undergone important divestitures, most notably the 
securities regulation remit in the 1930s, consumer product safety in the 
1970s, and some elements of financial services in 2010.  Each divestiture 
principally involved a consumer protection mandate. 
 On several occasions, the FTC has confronted circumstances where 
the original Congressional allocation of regulatory oversight turns out to be 
non-adaptive.  Consider broadband information services.  These products 
did not exist (nor were they even imagined) when Congress created the 
Federal Communications Commission.  Indeed, the FCC’s statutory 
framework is premised on the belief that the lowest cost way to provide 
telecommunications services is to have a single firm in each geographic 
area, and subject that firm to comprehensive oversight by a specialist public 
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utility body.  Over the past thirty years, changes in technology have made it 
apparent that this model is neither inevitable nor optimal, and that 
competition in a variety of areas is both feasible and desirable.  The 
development of the internet and broadband information services have 
resulted in considerable dispute over whether the FCC has exclusive 
regulatory authority, or whether the FTC has a role to play.120  Jurisdiction 
over privacy on the internet has created similar difficulties, as noted 
previously. 
The FTC’s experience shows both the promise and peril of scalable 
allocations of regulatory authority.  On numerous occasions, the federal 
courts have declared that the FTC’s unfairness authority under section 5 of 
the FTC Act confers broad powers to reach a range of conduct not 
previously condemned by statute or judicial decisions.121  This expansive 
authority gives the FTC the ability to address new commercial phenomena 
and create new norms of conduct.  For example, the FTC’s emergence as 
the principal federal enforcement body concerning data protection and 
privacy built upon the application of the Commission’s unfairness authority, 
but no one was thinking about the Internet and online privacy in 1914, when 
Section 5 of the FTC Act was written.   
The FTC’s experience also demonstrates that the application of a 
highly scaleable mandate can create three distinct traps.  First, legislators 
and other external observers come to regard the agency as a solution for all 
problems that have an apparent connection to the expansive mandate.  For 
example, substantial increases in the prices of certain commodities can be 
depicted as the result of "unfair" or overreaching behavior by the suppliers 
of those goods.  Suppose that armed conflict in a major crude oil production 
region causes crude oil prices soar.  This shock, in turn, forces gasoline 
prices upward.  Gasoline prices increase because the cost of the principal 
input for making gasoline has risen, yet legislators may attribute the price 
changes to collusion or unconscionable conduct by petroleum industry 
refiners.  The agency with the highly elastic mandate will be urged to take 
steps (e.g., attacking "price gouging") to push prices downward, yet any 
                                                
120  Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) 
(broadband services deemed not to be telecommunications services within meaning of 
Telecommunications Act); see also William E. Kovacic, FTC Jurisdiction Over Broadband 
Services, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (June 14, 2006) 
(FTC prepared statement stating that Brand X gives FTC jurisdiction over broadband 
services), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/Os/2006/06/pd52103commissiontestimonybroadbandinternetaccessserv
ices06142006Senate.pdf. 
121 The formative analysis of this jurisprudence is Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of 
‘Unfair Methods of Competition’ in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 
Boston College Law Review 227 (1980).  
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measures taken will not address the underlying cause and may retard market 
responses that eventually would cure the problem. 
Second, an agency with a sweeping and adaptable mandate has 
every incentive to push the outer boundaries of its authority, to show it is 
fulfilling the goals set for it by Congress.  Unless the agency binds itself to 
do otherwise, it will find it easy to expand its claimed authority without 
grounding its initiatives in a rigorous conceptual framework that specifies 
the logic for intervention and simultaneously delimits the outer boundaries 
of the agency’s assertion of authority.  Open-ended assertions of authority 
invite carelessness in the application of the agency’s powers and blind it to 
the broader institutional and political implications of expansive forms of 
intervention.  These lapses can trigger rebukes from reviewing courts and 
provoke severe political backlash.122  Spiderman said it best: with great 
power comes great responsibility. Agencies engaged in hot pursuit of what 
they perceive to be evil-doers have a distinct tendency to ignore this point. 
The third trap arises from the possibility for the agency to exploit 
opportunities for what might be called regulatory leveraging across its range 
of policy duties.  This is evident in recent FTC matters involving mainstays 
of the information services sector such as Google.  In the development of 
the agency’s privacy program, the Commission in recent years has 
expressed a keen interest in encouraging companies to adopt stronger data 
protection measures and to afford consumers more control over the use of 
information that companies collect about their preferences.  Some of the 
targets of the FTC’s privacy related interests (e.g., Google) have appeared 
before the FTC in the course of inquiries related to issues arising under the 
Commission’s competition authority.  Google, for example, underwent 
extensive FTC antitrust reviews concerning its acquisition of Doubleclick 
and Admob, respectively.   
During the FTC’s deliberations over Google’s mergers, some 
Commission officials and staff advocated that the agency use the merger 
review process (where companies are obliged by law to notify the federal 
antitrust agencies in advance of certain mergers) to exact concessions from 
the merging parties concerning their privacy policies and data protection 
practices.  The Commission resisted this impulse in the Doubleclick and 
Admob matters, but it subsequently carried out parallel competition and 
consumer protection inquiries in connection with Google’s search practices. 
These matters point to a scenario that might unfold in the future.  An agency 
with multiple functions might use its gatekeeping powers under one 
function to induce a company to make concessions with respect to issues 
                                                
122 This history is recounted in William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition 
Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 Antitrust 
L.J. 929 (2010). 
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arising under separate elements of the agency’s policy portfolio.  For 
example, the FTC might tell an information services firm that it will 
approve a merger (or accelerate approval of a merger) if the enterprise 
promises to make changes to its privacy practices – a matter normally 
implicating the FTC’s consumer protection powers.  In this way, an 
multipurpose agency might achieve policy outcomes that a single purpose 
agency might find more difficult to realize.     
   
  5. Internal Organizational Cohesion: Will the Combination Result 
 in Synergies, Distrust, or Civil War? 
 
The FTC features a substantial degree of insularity with its Bureaus 
of Competition and Consumer Protection.  The relationship between these 
two groups is more one of rivalry or indifference rather than cooperation. 
Policy integration takes place mainly at the Commission level and through 
the work of the Bureau of Economics and the FTC’s Office of Policy 
Planning.  This means that, if the analytical synergies between the two 
disciplines are substantial, a less than ideal amount of combined consumer 
protection and competition analysis takes place at the case handling and 
middle management levels. 
We have mentioned earlier that multi-purpose agencies typically 
create single-purpose operating units to carry out specific duties.  These 
units, in turn, tend to compete with each other for attention and resources, 
including outlays for personnel, office space, and control over infrastructure 
assets such as the information technology network.  This phenomenon can 
be observed at the FTC and a number of other agencies that combine 
competition and consumer protection duties.  Intramural competition for 
prestige and resources can cause agency officials to spend substantial effort 
refereeing disputes among rival divisions.  These are resources that 
otherwise would be applied to serving program needs. 
Intramural rivalry also can have other costs.  If the rationale for 
combining functions is to realize synergies between discrete areas of 
responsibility, the rivalry for prestige and resources can create internal 
tensions that defeat the realization of synergies in practice.  Where 
individual operating units strive to create separate identities, personnel 
within those units may establish strong loyalties to their own units and 
define success by the achievements of their units.  Projects that entail 
cooperation across operating units may be seen by group as relatively 
unimportant or simply contrary to each group’s interests, even though 
greater collaboration across units would advance projects that serve the 
larger aims of the institution as a whole.  Where its main operating units are 
assigned specific functions, a multi-purpose agency may find it difficult to 
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mobilize resources across units unless it can create a “we’re all in this 
together” ethos.  Otherwise, top agency leadership may have to spend 
substantial effort refereeing disputes among rival divisions.  These are 
resources that otherwise would be applied to serve program needs.   
That said, some dynamic tension across units can be helpful.  As 
noted previously, at the FTC, the formulation of consumer protection policy 
(including financial services) has been informed by the analysis and 
research of the agency’s Bureau of Economics (BE).  In general terms, BE 
serves as a voice for the value of competition, for the inclusion of market-
oriented strategies in the mix of regulatory tools, and for the awareness of 
costs associated with specific regulatory choices.  BE also performs 
empirical research that has yielded major insights into how consumers 
perceive disclosures provided in financial services instruments.  In all 
matters, BE makes an independent recommendation to the Commission 
about the desirability of specific cases, rules, or other proposed initiatives.  
BE has emphasized that excessively stringent regulatory controls can (a) 
overlook strategies that harness market processes to achieve social policy 
goals, and (b) suppress forms of competition that themselves can yield 
significant benefits to consumers.   
The institutional arrangements through which the Bureau of 
Economics makes an independent recommendation to the board helps prod 
the board to pay attention to regulatory costs and to the role of competition 
and market-based responses in protecting consumer interests.  The FTC’s 
Bureau of Economics (and, to a lesser extent, the FTC’s Bureau of 
Competition) help ensure the FTC takes account of the economic costs and 
benefits of law enforcement and rulemaking proposals from the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection – and the knowledge that their proposals will be 
scrutinized in this fashion forces the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection 
to explicitly take account of these matters in making its recommendations in 
the first instance.123  
Consider a concrete example.  In 2007, Michael Sallinger, the head 
of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, spoke at a conference jointly sponsored 
by the FTC and the National Association of Attorneys General to discuss 
policy toward the gasoline industry, including the enforcement of price 
gouging laws.  His narrative underscores the value of economic analysis as 
a discipline upon the FTC’s decision making process: 
  
After hurricane Wilma, a man in Miami with a 
flatbed truck drove it to North Carolina – several hundred 
                                                
123 Luke Froeb et al, The Economics of Organizing Economists, July, 2008, at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1155237.    
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miles away – and purchased a set of portable generators, 
paying roughly $300 for some and $500 for others.  He 
drove the truck back to Miami and sold the generators for 
approximately double what he had paid for them.  The state 
sued him for price gouging.      
As a matter of economics, this suit was seriously 
misguided policy.  The initiative shown by this truck owner 
helped alleviate the shortage of electricity.  We do not need 
to give him an award for his initiative.  The market did that, 
or at least it would have if he had not had to pay a fine to the 
state.  But we certainly should not be penalizing him.  The 
next time a disaster strikes Miami, perhaps the truck owner 
will try to think of ways to help ease a shortage and simply 
decline to profit from it.  Perhaps.  But that’s not where I 
would put my money.  More likely, he will just stay put; and 
those people who would have voluntarily purchased 
whatever supplies he chose to provide will simply go 
without.  I am confident that professional economists would 
agree with my assessment of this case.   
But not everyone in the workshop did.  As the 
discussion of the episode unfolded, it was clear that there 
was a divide in the room between the people who work on 
antitrust for the states and those who work on consumer 
protection.  The consumer protection people in the room 
generally approved of the case and of price gouging laws 
more generally.  It was that discussion that made me realize 
how valuable economics is to the consumer protection 
mission of the FTC.  I cannot imagine people from our 
Bureau of Consumer Protection arguing for such a case; and 
I cannot help thinking that it is the result of the ongoing 
dialog between lawyers and economists at the Commission 
about what sorts of consumer protection cases make 
economic sense that the cases we bring do make economic 
sense.124   
 
  6.  Collateral Effects Upon the Regulatory Ecosystem 
 
As noted earlier, Congress frequently assigns regulatory 
responsibility for a specific sector or practice to more than one federal 
                                                
124 Michael A. Salinger, Economics Supporting the Twin Missions of the FTC, Apr. 20, 
2007, at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/salinger/070420breakfast.pdf  
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agency.  The FTC’s expansive competition and consumer protection 
responsibilities overlap with or share boundaries the duties of numerous 
other federal agencies, as well as a host of state public bodies.  The FTC’s 
very formation in 1914 and the agency’s subsequent movement into other 
policy domains, some by legislative fiat and others through the exercise of 
the FTC’s discretion, have affected the larger regulatory ecosystem. To a 
large degree, the FTC coexists peacefully with its public agency 
counterparts.  At the same time, the existing distribution of authority 
complicates the execution of routine regulatory tasks. 
 
a.  Inter-Agency Coordination 
 
The agency devotes substantial resources to inter-government 
coordination.  The need in many instances to collaborate with other public 
institutions delays the implementation of new initiatives.  In a wide range of 
areas, the FTC cannot act unilaterally.  Adjustments in the oversight of 
advertising involving food and health claims require close consultation with 
the Food and Drug Administration.  The implementation of new legislative 
mandates involving market manipulation of petroleum products demands 
collaboration with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which 
pressed the FTC to narrow as much as possible the scope of its market 
manipulation rule.  The drafting by the Department of Health and Human 
Services of the new rule on Accountable Care Organizations took place 
through an often contentious collaboration among the FTC, DOJ, and HHS.  
Dodd Frank mandates coordination between the CFPB and the FTC over 
the future allocation of enforcement tasks related to non-bank financial 
institutions. The fact of shared responsibility and common mandates means 
that few collaborative exercises in setting rules or bringing cases proceed 
expeditiously.  
 
i.  New Entry in an Existing Regulatory Arena: The Case of 
Antitrust 
 
The FTC’s establishment in 1914 placed the FTC into a policy 
domain already occupied by two other institutions.  First, the Clayton and 
FTC Acts ended the Justice Department’s position of exclusivity in the 
federal government’s enforcement of the antitrust laws.  In particular, the 
Clayton Act gave DOJ and FTC concurrent authority to enforce its 
provisions and did not specify a decision making rule to determine which 
agency would handle specific matters.  The FTC Act moved the FTC into 
the adjudication of federal antitrust matters, a realm that had been the 
exclusive responsibility of the federal judiciary.   
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Neither of these incursions into the existing ecosystem pleased the 
incumbents.  In its first decades, the FTC suffered many debilitating defeats 
in the federal courts.  Some setbacks stemmed from serious weaknesses in 
the FTC’s process.  The Commission’s early custom was to issue decisions 
without elaboration of their legal reasoning and to present the rationale for 
decisions only in briefs before the courts.  This habit did the agency no 
favors when it came time to argue that it deserved deference before the 
appellate courts.  Yet appellate decisions of this period also reveal a 
hostility that cannot be explained solely by the Commission’s poor opinion-
writing.  The courts did not welcome the introduction of a new adjudication 
institution – to some degree, a rival – with open arms.  
Nor was the Department of Justice pleased with the arrival of a new 
body with whom it would henceforth share decision making tasks.  From 
early days until the present, the most frequent point of friction has been the 
allocation of files where both agencies have competence to review a matter.  
At times in the 1920s, the two agencies each opened a file to deal with the 
same conduct.  The agencies devised informal methods of consultation to 
above duplicative parallel inquiries and embodied these understandings in a 
formal instrument in the late 1940s.  The agreement established the process 
by which one agency would “clear” matters to the other.   
Since the late 1940s, this liaison arrangement (commonly called 
“clearance”) has provided the means by which the agencies avoid conflicts 
in the exercise of their concurrent power under the Clayton Act.125  A 2002 
press release describes how this process has worked (and not worked) over 
time, with agencies handling particular cases based primarily on their 
previous expertise in a particular industry:  
[B]ecause the FTC had experience with automobiles, it 
conducted investigations in that industry; similarly, DOJ 
investigated steel matters. . . .   
In recent years, the process has become more 
contentious as the convergence of industries has blurred 
bright lines between industry boundaries. For example, 
                                                
125 James C. Grimaldi, Enron Case Attracts Lawyers Like a Flame Attracts Moths, 
More than You Can Shake A Stick At, Washington Post, Jan. 28, 2002, at E2  (“There are a 
handful of industries in which both the FTC and Justice Department have expertise. So 
when a hot merger comes up, and the staff of each agency wants a piece of it, the assistant 
attorney general for antitrust and the FTC chairman have to sort it out.  This had been done 
in an ancient ritual that included a series of athletic events such as arm wrestling, mud 
wrestling, greased-pig wrestling and a bull-riding competition, and an essay contest.  Okay, 
we're making that up. Well, most of it. The agencies really do write essays explaining why 
they are best to review the mergers.”).  See also Lauren Kearney Peay, The Cautionary 
Tale of the Failed 2002 FTC/DOJ Merger Clearance Accord, 60 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1307 
(2008).    
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because the DOJ historically has investigated electricity, 
while the FTC has investigated all other energy matters, 
convergence mergers between electricity and natural gas 
companies have led to contentious disputes regarding which 
agency should investigate. Moreover, although the FTC 
predominantly has investigated computer hardware and the 
DOJ has investigated computer software, matters involving 
both have become increasingly common, resulting in 
clearance disputes.   
In the 1980s, there were only about 10 disputes per 
year. Since then, the average has exceeded 80. These 
disputes result in significant delays. Delays averaging three 
weeks occurred in 24 percent of the matters on which 
clearance was sought from the beginning of FY 2000 
through January 28, 2002. . . During this time, neither 
agency could investigate potentially serious allegations of 
illegal behavior.126 
   
As this passage suggests, most matters are cleared quickly and 
unobtrusively.  Some are highly contentious.  The contested matters, though 
few in number, imbue the DOJ/FTC relationship with an undercurrent of 
suspicion and distrust that undermines the effectiveness of the relationship. 
The element of tension has become more acute with the ascent of the FTC 
in the modern era to a position of peer status with the DOJ.  From 1914 
through the 1960s, DOJ was clearly the preeminent U.S. antitrust body.  
Through a slow and at times uneven process of improvement, the FTC over 
the past twenty years has matched DOJ in prestige.  This transformation has 
increased the stakes of clearance disputes as each agency seeks to claim 
policy terrain that will increase its visibility and accomplishments. 
The FTC’s dual identify as a competition and consumer protection 
agency promises to be a source of instability in the agency’s relationship 
                                                
126 http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/04/clearanceoverview.shtm.  See also Grimaldi, supra at 
E2  (“The 'discussions' would last more than two weeks sometimes, and that's almost half 
the 30 days in which investigators must decide whether to launch a more detailed review, 
called a "second request" for documents. Delays of more than 15 days occurred 32 times in 
2000.”) 
The clearance process also created other problems not mentioned in the press 
release.  Resolution of clearance disputes was supposed to be based on the comparative 
expertise of each agency – but the agencies controlled whether or not they initiated cases in 
each area – and both knew that the first agency to bring a case in a new area would be more 
likely to get all cases arising out of that area into perpetuity.  The clearance process thus 
encouraged “gun-jumping” by the agencies – each seeking to be the first-mover, 
irrespective of the relative strength of the case(s) in question.   
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with DOJ.  As noted above, consumer protection and competition law have 
important conceptual complementarities.  In principle, the unification of 
supply and demand side perspectives can yield a better understanding of 
specific commercial phenomena, a better diagnosis of apparent problems, 
and the design of a more effective solution.  In recent years, the FTC has 
made a point of issuing complaints that invoke an amalgam of competition 
and consumer protection theories of harm.  The FTC’s settlement in 2010 of 
claims of improper single firm conduct by Intel relied upon competition and 
consumer protection theories of liability, and FTC officials have 
emphasized the hybrid nature of this resolution.127  Earlier FTC decisions, 
such as the settlement in Negotiated Data Solutions (N-Data), also featured 
a mix of competition and consumer protection rationales.128  Most recently, 
the FTC initiated parallel competition and consumer protection inquiries 
involving Google’s practices in the market for internet-based search. 
DOJ might view the FTC’s application of hybrid 
competition/consumer protection theories with suspicion.  DOJ might see 
the FTC’s recent practice as a strategic move to establish a superior basis to 
claim clearance.  The FTC might be preparing to assert that individual 
matters pose a mix of competition and consumer protection issues and 
therefore should be analyzed by an agency with jurisdiction over both 
domains.  Let us assume that the FTC’s move is not a strategic ploy to 
claim more policy terrain. Suppose, instead, that the FTC’s work reflects 
the view that the application of the two disciplines can product better policy 
outcomes in some cases.  Three solutions are possible in these situations.  
One is to allocate such files to the FTC because the FTC’s mandate 
encompasses both competencies.  The second solution is to give the file to 
the DOJ on the condition that the two agencies cooperate closely to permit 
the FTC to contribute its consumer protection expertise to DOJ’s analysis.  
The third is for DOJ to hire officials with consumer protection backgrounds 
to work on its cases. 
There is another way in which the FTC’s application of a fusion of 
competition and consumer protection perspectives could upset the existing 
order of federal antitrust enforcement.  That is the possibility for regulatory 
leveraging described above.  The FTC could be tempted to use its 
competition policy mandate to obtain policy concessions that relate mainly 
to consumer protection.  In the guise of doing a competition policy analysis, 
the FTC might inform the firm that it will allow the transaction to proceed if 
the firm makes commitments with respect to other policy commands (e.g., 
                                                
127 In re Intel Corp., D. 9341 (FTC Oct. 29, 2010) (decision and order), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adpro/d9341/101102inteldo.pdf. 
128 In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, C-4234 (FTC Sept. 22, 2008) (decision and 
order), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080923ndsd0.pdf. 
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data protection) within the Commission’s policy portfolio ata protection 
regime.  For example, regulatory leveraging could enable the FTC to realize 
privacy policy objectives that might not be obtainable directly through the 
prosecution of a consumer protection case or the promulgation of a 
consumer protection rule.  
There is a constraint on the FTC’s ability to engage in this type of 
leveraging.  If it became apparent that the FTC was using merger review to 
advance a consumer protection agenda, the existing framework of merger 
analysis (which does not incorporate consumer protection considerations) 
would be called into question.  Success with such an approach would 
depend on the FTC’s ability to depict the consumer protection issues as 
elements of a more sophisticated form of competition analysis.  
Whether its duties encompass only competition law or competition 
law plus other functions, an agency rarely has exclusive power to shape 
policy within the policy domains assigned to it.  Single-purpose and multi-
purpose agencies often share responsibility for a given field of oversight 
with still another government agency or agencies.  By the conscious design 
of a legislature or by accident, a multiplicity of regulatory decision makers 
for the same policy area tends to emerge over time.  In the field of 
competition and consumer protection policy, for example, it is common for 
the competition agency to share policy making responsibility with sectoral 
regulators that have concurrent or sequential power to review mergers or 
allegations of abusive behavior by dominant firms.   
   
  7.  Political Implications 
 
The dual-role nature of the FTC presents the agency with political 
benefits and disadvantages.  The principle benefit, mentioned above, is the 
possibility of cross subsidization that improves the effectiveness of the FTC 
competition program.  Consumer protection measures such as the Do Not 
Call registry have created substantial policy capital surpluses for the 
Commission, and these can be spent effectively to initiate difficult new 
matters or to resist political pressure to engage in programs that the agency 
believes to be improvident.   
There are disadvantages in the existing distribution of power, 
although these may be rooted mainly in the FTC’s inherently close 
relationship to Congress.  The FTC’s ties to Congress introduce severe 
rigidities into the agency’s ability to allocate tasks to other agencies with 
whom it shares policy responsibilities. In 2002, the Agencies sought to 
implement a permanent structural solution to the clearance problem by 
explicitly allocating exclusive responsibility for particular sectors of the 
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economy to either the FTC or the DOJ.129  Among other features, the 
agreement would have dedicated the telecommunications and media sectors 
to DOJ while reserving electric power, health care, and aerospace to the 
FTC.130  Although the proposal attracted bipartisan support and was hailed 
by antitrust practitioners, business groups, and former FTC and DOJ 
personnel, it was ultimately sunk by the vehement opposition of Senator 
Ernest Hollings, who argued that mergers among media corporations should 
be reviewed by the FTC.  Senator Hollings, as chairman of the Commerce 
Committee, had oversight authority over the FTC, but not over the DOJ 
(which fell within the jurisdiction of the Senate Judiciary Committee).  
Hollings had one other important pressure point to exploit.  He chaired the 
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee that oversees the funding of both the 
Justice Department and the FTC, and he threatened to reduce the budgets of 
both agencies unless the clearance agreement was abrogated.   
Senator Hollings and his staff feared that adoption of the FTC and 
DOJ’s clearance agreement would have largely eliminated the flow of 
campaign contributions from telecommunication and media corporations to 
members of the Senate Commerce Committee, and he apparently concluded 
that any new campaign contributions from electric power, health care, and 
aerospace firms would not be enough to make up the deficit.131   
In the 1970s, FTC management failed to foresee the political 
consequences of programs that applied the agencies expansive powers in a 
broad manner.  The FTC did not anticipate the political feedback generated 
by matters that affected significant economic interests.  The Commission’s 
competition, consumer protection, and economic research programs cut an 
astonishingly broad swath through American commerce.  Not only did the 
Commission take on well-known giants of U.S. industry and, in many cases, 
threaten them with remedies such as divestiture and compulsory trademark 
licensing, it also attacked sectors that provided the backbone of small and 
medium-sized enterprise across the country.  This dynamic set in motion 
powerful lobbying campaigns before Congress, resulting in strong 
legislative backlash.  In its selection of measures, the FTC was inattentive 
to the political risk associated with each new initiative and to the aggregate 
political significance of its sweeping portfolio of programs. 
Expansive grants of authority may also serve the electoral needs of 
individual legislators.132 Once Congress has delegated an ambitious range 
                                                
129http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/clearance/ftcdojagree.pdf. 
130 Id. 
131 This episode is described in William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in High-Tech Industries: 
Improving the Federal Antitrust Joint Venture, 19 George Mason L. Rev. 1097, 1111-12 
(2012). 
132 Fred McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of 
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of regulatory tasks to an agency, individual legislators or committees will 
predictably urge the regulatory agency to use its powers aggressively.  
Firms affected by the agency’s activities will predictably complain to the 
Congress, especially to oversight committees whose members are recipients 
of contributions supplied by the regulated industry.  Individual members or 
committees will predictably demand that the agency temper its intervention.   
One can accomplish some of the same objectives by introducing a bill to 
regulate the industry, but using a middleman leaves fewer fingerprints.  
Such strategies need not be deployed very often; affected firms will make 
campaign contributions even if there is not a live controversy, to ensure 
they will have access to members when they need it -- meaning that service 
on an oversight committee is accompanied by an annuity from the affected 
firms.  
 
V. Divide or Conquer? 
 
If a particular competition policy conglomerate is not “working,” 
then there are at least two different ways of solving that problem: one can 
divide (separating the conglomerate into distinct entities, each of which has 
a sole area of policy responsibility), or conquer (turn responsibility for the 
conglomerate over to new management, drawn from a different part of the 
government.)133  Part III contains multiple examples of such initiatives.  
Examples of division include the decision by Congress in 1947 to establish 
the Air Force as a separate body by divesting functions previously 
performed by the U.S. Army and its Air Corps, the spinning off in the 1974 
of the National Transportation Safety Board from the Department of 
Transportation, and the repositioning of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission as a distinct institution removed from its former home within 
the Atomic Energy Commission.  Prominent illustrations of conquest 
include the absorption of numerous border protection institutions (such as 
the U.S. Coast Guard) into the Department of Homeland Security, the 
amalgamation of various financial services regulatory functions into the 
Consumer Protection Financial Bureau, and the removal of the Fish and 
Wildlife Service from the Departments of Agriculture and its relocation 
inside the Department of the Interior. 
 
Experience with competition agencies also features examples of 
division and conquest.  A major example of division occurred in the 1930s, 
when the FTC incubated the securities regulatory functions eventually 
                                                                                                                       
Regulation, 16 J. Legal Studies 101 (1987). 
133 We do not view the addition of additional divisions to the competition policy 
conglomerate as an example of “conquer,” since it will not solve the underlying problem.   
 Divide or Conquer?  
 
66 
transferred to the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Conquest 
episodes include the assimilation in 2011 by Ireland’s Competition 
Authority of the country’s consumer protection agency.  A complex 
variation that exhibits elements of both is the pending restructuring of the 
United Kingdom’s competition policy system.  The existing Office of Fair 
Trading and the Competition Commission will be reconstituted as a new 
Competition and Markets Authority, with many of the OFT’s consumer 























How should we decide between these two possibilities?  
Space precludes a full answer, but a campaign speech by then-
Candidate (and later) President Franklin Delano Roosevelt suggests 
a framework for thinking about the decision, and for answering 
which agency (among the many that are available) should do the 
conquering.  
There are four different kinds of bears in the United 
States, and, of course, all these bears come under the 
jurisdiction of one Government department or another. I 
think it is the brown bear that comes under the jurisdiction of 
the Department of the Interior, and I think the black bear 
comes under the Department of Agriculture; and the Alaska 
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bear comes under the Department of Commerce; and 
jurisdiction over the grizzly bear is held by the Department 
of War.  That has been going on from time immemorial in 
Washington.  Each bear - the care of the bear and everything 
else about the bear -falls under a different department, 
depending on the genus of the bear.  And I am told 
confidentially that sometimes there is a most awful mixup, 
because sometimes a black bear falls in love with a brown 
bear, and then nobody knows under what department the 
puppies belong.134 
Consider how each of the four listed “parent” agencies would 
behave in response to misconduct by their respective “bear-children” and 
“grand-bear-children.”  Those same characteristics are likely to inform the 
conquering agency’s behavior if they are given responsibility for the 
competition agency.  
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
Why should anyone care about the organization of the agency 
charged with implementing competition law?  Professor Amy Zegart 
concisely answered the first question:    
 
Organization is never neutral.  As any Washington taxi 
driver can point out, government organization has serious 
implications for policy outcomes. . . . When it comes to 
selecting, shaping, and implementing. . . policy, the devil 
often lies in the details of agency design.135  
 
On the issue of whether the agency should be divided or conquered, 
not every problem in competition law and policy requires a “shoot first, 
shoot later, and then when everybody's dead try to ask a question or two” 
mindset.136  If your competition agency behaves like that, it may be time for 
a change.     
 
                                                
134 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Extemporaneous Campaign Address, Binghamton, 
N.Y., Oct. 17, 1928, available at 1 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
16 (1938).   
135 AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC 
I-II (1999).   
136 Cf. Wild, Wild West (1999) (“Mr. West, not every situation requires your patented 
approach of shoot first, shoot later, shoot some more and then when everybody's dead try to 
ask a question or two.”) available at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120891/quotes  
